

ISHA Journal

Publication Series of the International Students of History Association

9/97

Man and Sea

Papers of the International ISHA Seminar
Pula, Croatia, 15-20, Sept, 1997

Edited by
Igor Duda
Tvrтко Jakovina
Renata Mikloška

Man and Sea

Papers of the International ISHA Seminar
Pula, Croatia
15-20, Sept, 1997

Edited by
Igor Duda
Tvrтко Jakovina
Renata Mikloška

The ISHA Journal is published by the
International Students of History Association.
The aim of this publication series is to offer
an international publication possibility
for history students from all around the world
including the papers of the Annual Conferences of ISHA
and ISHA International seminars.

ISSN 1203 - 1048

The International Students of History Association is an international,
academic, non-profit-making, independent network of students and recent
graduates interested in history and related sciences. ISHA seeks to create and
coordinate means of co-operation and exchange between history students and
young people of all background.
For further information, please contact the International Secretariat of ISHA.

ISHA International Secretariat
Blijde Inkomststraat 21
B - 3000 Leuven, Belgium
Phone: (+) 32 - 16 - 23 29 26
Fax: (+) 32 - 16 - 32 50 25
E-mail: isha@arts.kuleuven.ac.be

Klub studenata povijesti - ISHA, Zagreb
FILOZOFSKI FAKULTET
ODSJEK ZA POVIJEST
Ivana Lučića 3
Zagreb

Printed in Croatia

CONTENTS

Foreword

Sandra Veselinović

Editorial

Igor Duda, Tvrtko Jakovina, Renata Mikloška

MAN AND SEA

Land, Sea and Man. The Eastern Adriatic in Ancient History

Robert Matijašić, PhD.

The Sea of Metaphors

Vera Costantini, *ISHA Venice*

The Phoenicians and Their Traderoutes. The Construction of a Sea Empire 3.000 Years Ago

Lorenzo Calvelli, *ISHA Venice*

The Vikings-Discovery and Settlements at the North Atlantic

Simone Janson, *ISHA Heidelberg*

The Chivalric Games of the Island of Rab in the Year

Krunoslava Škunca, *ISHA Zadar*

The Venetian Fleet. Biography of a Venetian Galley

Antonio Conzato, *ISHA Venice*

Condemned to Row on a Galley. Living Conditions aboard the Venetian Galleys and Legal Reforms During the Second Half of the 16th Century

Photis Baroutsos, *ISHA Corfu*

Galley-slaves: Sad Adriatic Stories from the 17th Century

Igor Duda, *ISHA Zagreb*

History of the Naval Affairs in the Slovenian Littoral

Matija Janežič, *ISHA Ljubljana*

Events in Finland and its Coast During the Crimean War 1854-1855

Rae Häikiö, *ISHA Helsinki*

Sea Power: a Good Investment?

Francisco Panteghini, *ISHA Venice*

The Gulf of Finland's Outer Islands in Negotiations Preceding the Finnish-Russian War of 1939-40

Mikko Väyrynen, *ISHA Helsinki*

The Duel of the Hood and the Bismarck (May 24-27, 1941)

Levente Benkő, *ISHA Budapest*

The lost enterprise. The Italian Navy during the Second World War

Giulio Bobbo, *ISHA Venice*

The Swiss Trade Fleet in the Second World War

Claudia Bertogg, Dominik Schatzmann, Christian Schmidtpeter, *ISHA Zurich*

Where are we going, where have we been?

(Few Words about ISHA's History and Future)

Tvrtko Jakovina

LIST OF PARTICIPIANS

LIST OF SPONSORS

FOREWORD

The seminar entitled "The Man and the Sea" was held in Pula from 15th until 20th of September, 1997 and it was the ISHA Zagreb's first international project. We realised it in co-operation with the Faculty of Philosophy, the University of Zagreb, and the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of Croatia.

We were satisfied with the response from different ISHA sections. Thirty-five participants from twelve sections (ISHA Bremen, ISHA Budapest, ISHA Corfu, ISHA Heidelberg, ISHA Helsinki, ISHA Leuven, ISHA Ljubljana, ISHA Venice, ISHA Vienna, ISHA Zurich, ISHA Zadar, ISHA Zagreb) were present in Pula.

Despite so many participants the number of presented works (papers) was only relatively high. The initial plan was to organise work in three different workshops. However, the insufficient number of papers resulted in the organisation of only one workshop. The advantage of that is that all participants have insight into other peoples' work but the disadvantage is that papers deal with such a wide range of subjects that it is too difficult to have one discussion and to make one final conclusion.

The work was not concentrated only on papers in workshops. ISHA Zagreb also organised sight-seeing tours such as visiting historical and cultural sights (Pula, Poreč, Brijuni National Park, Istrian villages).

This Journal is the result of our joint work in Pula as well as the result of efforts made by ISHA Zagreb during the months that followed the conference. Past examples have shown that publishing of a journal may be a difficult job, so many participants at previous conferences did not have the opportunity to have their papers published. However, ISHA Zagreb tried its best and we are proud to succeed in this work.

The quality of the Journal depends, more or less, on quality of the presented papers and I have to say that quality varies from paper to paper. Some of them are result of serious scholarly work and research and some are not. By printing results of this work we want to encourage the enthusiasts to keep on working because they keep ISHA spirit alive and this is what ISHA needs the most.

On behalf of ISHA Zagreb I would like to thank all the authors of the papers for giving us solid bases for discussion and all the participants in Pula who kept discussion alive.

Sandra Veselinović,

"The Man and the Sea" workshop's leader

EDITORIAL

One of the main goals of the International Students of History Association (ISHA) is to provide young historians with the possibility to publish their papers and especially to do that in English. However, many papers written and presented during different ISHA seminars and conferences would not have survived strict scientific criteria. During many ISHA administrative meetings members of the Academic Board were discussing this problem rather often. How to improve the academic level of the Association? Should we or should we not publish every paper presented and prepared for our conferences? Some ISHA members are also not particularly fluent in English and cannot express themselves clearly enough in a language that is not their mother tongue. Although there were many even drastic proposals, the majority of ISHA sections have concluded once again that ISHA is just a students' association. Therefore editors of ISHA publications do not have the right to decide which papers satisfy academic criteria and which do not. All papers should be printed, no matter how understandable and good they are.

Members of ISHA Zagreb who were preparing publishing of the papers delivered during our international seminar organised in Pula in September 1997 were facing so many problems that were not solvable. Some authors made so many mistakes in English (literally in every sentence) that we hardly managed to understand what was written. Since our intention was to edit texts as little as possible, we only intervened in those texts in order to make them understandable. In all other examples, we have decided to leave things as they were presented in Pula. The same practice was followed by the editors of some previously published ISHA-publications. The editors do not take the responsibility for possible inaccuracies or mistakes made by the authors of the articles.

We would also like to thank Ana, Kristina, Marina, Sandra and Petar for their support and help. Without them this job would not be possible.

Editors:

Igor Duda

Tvrtko Jakovina

Renata Mikloška

Robert Matijašić, PhD., *Faculty of Pedagogy, Pula*

LAND, SEA AND MAN.

THE EASTERN ADRIATIC IN ANCIENT HISTORY

The land, the sea and man, this anthropical triad, were interactive throughout history, and not only on the Eastern Adriatic. The geographical, physical features of a region, together with the human, social and anthropological component, these are the ingredients of history.

Looking at a map of this part of Europe, one can easily see how important and valuable the geographical position of Istria is, and it certainly was in the past. It is situated at the head of the Adriatic, between Central Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, between Italy and the Bosnian and Panonian regions. This was naturally reflected in history in various ways, and these influences differed in time, depending on what went on in bordering regions. The Adriatic Sea defines the Istrian peninsula on two sides of its triangular shape. The link with the mainland over a range of mountains from Rijeka to Trieste blocks physical communications to a certain degree. Owing to the shape of the coast, the southern and western coast is better suited for traffic connections, and all major towns are in this area.

For a long time, since at least the 7th century, Istria has been on the crossroads of Romance, Germanic and Slav languages, cultures and peoples. Before that, it had been part of the Roman Empire since the 2nd century BC. The peninsula got its name from the Histri, the pre-Roman, Iron Age inhabitants of the region. They bordered with the Veneti to the West (beyond Trieste) and with the Liburni to the East. The boundary between the Histri and Liburni was on the river Arsia, and in Roman times it became the boundary between Italy, because Istria was part of the Augustean 10th Italic Region, and the province of Illyricum, subsequently Dalmatia.

In protohistoric times the sea-lanes of the Adriatic were very important for the circulation of persons, ideas, materials and technologies, particularly from the Greek and Eastern Mediterranean areas to the North Adriatic. However, it functioned both ways, because the amber from the Baltic Sea arrived by land-routes again to the head of the Adriatic, and then by sea to Greece, where it was very popular in prehistoric and protohistoric times, but in the Geometric period as well. The so-called "Amber Route" traversed Central Europe from Poland to the Eastern Alps, continuing from the port of Aquileia by land to Northern Italy and by sea along the Adriatic.

Anyway, we find the Histri for the first time in ancient written fonts in the 7-6th century BC, and archaeological finds confirm the contacts of these protohistoric people with distant areas. The first Greek notions concerning these regions were connected to the mythological story of the Argonauts, who had travelled the Danube (Ister) upstream from the Black Sea to a supposed "second mouth" of the Danube in the Adriatic near Istria. Only in the last centuries BC was this notion corrected. Although it probably reflects the commercial route across the Eastern Alps, from the Danube basin to the Adriatic.

The period between the 7th and 4th century BC seems to be the highest point of development for the Histri on the Adriatic. In their graves, particularly in *Nesactium* (10 km from Pula), many examples of imported objects, pottery in most cases, were found. There are almost no traces of extra-Adriatic contacts, or they were minimal. Particularly fashionable for the Histri were painted pots from the region of the Veneti (Este), the Dauni (later Apulia, today Puglia).

It might be interesting to ask ourselves what kind of commerce they practised? What did they export to import painted pottery and other objects? In Istria, there are no traces of minerals (except limestone for building), the peninsula is not ideally suited for agriculture, no important commercial centres developed before the Romans.

So, where is the answer? When the first contacts of the Histri with the Romans produced the first mentions of the former in Latin historiography, they were recorded as pirates. They were considered as such together with other eastern Adriatic tribes (Illyrians, Delmatians, Liburnians) as "gentes ferae et magna ex parte latrociniiis maritimis infames" (e.g.: wild tribes, mainly infamous for brigandage on the sea). That was Titius Livius for the year 302 BC, while in the *Periochae* (the Summaries of his lost books) for the year 231 BC we find a short sentence that the Histri were subjugated, conquered by the Romans. In 221-220 BC again there are traces of a war between the Histri and the Romans, while the final war took place in 178 and 177 BC. This final conquest was the consequence of the fact that in 183-181 the Romans founded the Latin colony of Aquileia, on border of the Histrian territory. According to Livius again, the Senate in 182 BC received a complaint by the inhabitants of Tarentum and Brundisium that Histrian ships threatened their coasts ("maritimos agros infestos transmarinarum navium latrociniiis esse").

Histrians, as Liburnians and other Eastern Adriatic tribes, were indeed pirates, as were most other tribes on the coasts of the Mediterranean where it was difficult to survive only from the land, usually infertile, good for pasture, but little else. Piracy was almost a legitimate means of subsistence on the fringes of the Mediterranean. We can, of course, define piracy as "robbery or illegal violence at sea", but ancient piracy is a much broader phenomenon. What is illegal from the viewpoint of a State, certainly is not so from another angle, that of the population of an inhospitable region incapable of feeding a large community. Pirates always exist and operate on the margins of so-called "civilised societies". Seen from Athens or Rome, pirates are a lower form of warriors and they must be tamed or destroyed because they threaten the stability of states and their economies.

That is why the Romans were so eager to engage in wars against the Illyrians (and the Histri). Not because they particularly wanted to conquer the Eastern Adriatic coast, but because they needed the sea-lanes to remain open. The Histri captured and looted the ships that sailed along the Eastern Adriatic coast from Greece to the Greek colonies of Adria and Spina, by which the grain from northern Italy was transported to the Greek towns.

Then, when the Romans conquered the whole Apennine peninsula, and came into the Po Valley, the Cisalpine Gaul, they also used the same route. Why? Because it is safer for sailing ships to travel along the Eastern coast of the Adriatic. The Dalmatian coast, with its hundreds of islands, thousands of bays and inlets, offers many more shelters in case of necessity than the Western, bare Apennine coast. That is why

the Romans had to control the coast, or at least the sea in the first period of their expansion in the region.

To control the sea without controlling the coast soon proved an impossible task. So the influence of Roman politics grew during the end of the 3rd and the beginning of the 2nd century BC, but the Senate regulated the relationships with various communities in various ways. Some were conquered and given a governor, some were forced to become *socii populi Romani*, others became allies spontaneously. Illyricum was at first, in the 2nd century BC, a peculiar province, non wholly organised, with only a coastal territory, and even that did not run along the whole coast.

Histria, between *Illyricum* and Cisalpine Gaul (*Gallia Cisalpina*), was part of an entity known as *Apulia et Histria*. Not long afterwards, as the province of Illyricum grew and became stronger, Histria was also made part of it, as its westernmost region.

Caesar received the proconsulate of Gaul and Illyricum after his consulship. He spent much more time in Gaul than in Illyricum, only his two stays in Aquileia are recorded. In these occasions he received envoys from several local and Greek communities, who recited their problems, generally concerning their disputes with neighbours: Liburni against Delmate, Issaeans versus Delmate.

After Caesar's proconsulate nothing remained the same in Istria and Dalmatia. It was probably through his political influence that most Roman colonies in the region were founded, in the late Fifties and early Forties of the 1st century BC. The colonies were the first centres of romanization. In Istria, for example, between 177 BC, when the Histri were conquered and pacified, and Caesar's activity in the Adriatic region, the Romans had no permanent urban settlement other than maybe military outposts along the coast, to control the navigation along it. The same must be supposed for Dalmatia, although there were some communities of Roman citizens, the *conventi Romanorum*, communities of merchants established themselves in places with an easy access to the interior and with a port.

The small settlements of Roman citizens were sometimes very unstable and dependent on the goodwill of the surrounding tribes and the influence of Greek communities on the islands and their sub-colonies on the mainland. Nevertheless, they were often chosen as sites for new settlements of Roman citizens: the *coloniae civium Romanorum*, autonomous cities with their own administration.

Colonies were founded by decree of the Senate, which appointed two or three commissioners to chose the site and organise the settlement both in the physical and administrative senses. All Adriatic caesarian colonies were founded probably between 48 and 45/44 BC: Pola, Iader, Salona, Naronia and Epidaurum. They were all on the coast, either on points important for the main Eastern Adriatic sea lane (Pola, Iader, two ramifications towards the Western Adriatic coast), or on points important for the communication with the interior of the territory (Salona, Naronia).

In a situation when colonies were established in a not yet completely conquered area (the region between the Pannonian Plain and the Adriatic Sea), there were no alternatives to positioning the new important settlements on the coast. The sea was their safest means of communication with the centre of the State. Moreover, from the coast started all the routes by which an army could conquer and control the interior – before a more radical romanization. Octavianus in 35 BC started in Senia when entering the territory of Iapudes, Colapiani and Segestani. Salona was one of the main bases of the Roman Army in

suppressing the revolt of the Breuci and Daesidiati in 6-9 AD (although another axis appeared by that time – from Aquileia to the Sava Valley and onwards to the Danube region).

In the case of the Eastern Adriatic Roman colonies, there are several causes for their development. Except for Pola (and later Parentium it was at first a *municipium*), the other colonies had not a prevailing agricultural character, in the sense that their territories were not as extended as those of earlier settlements in the Po Valley. The Karst surroundings simply did not present the necessary natural resources for extensive or intensive agriculture on a wide area. The land divisions of the territories of Iader and Salona are much smaller than that of Pola. It is obvious in the case of Salona, a colony that could have had around 30000 inhabitants, while Pola could have had not more than 5000.

So, trade was a very important factor, if not even a prevailing one, in the establishing and existence of Eastern Adriatic colonies. As I said, they were all important ports on the sea route along the coast. It was the main sailing line from Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean to the ports of the Northern Adriatic: Aquileia and Ravenna. Aquileia was the main link by road to the Eastern Alps (*Alpes Iuliae*) and further on to the Danube frontier of the Empire, so that all communications also from southern Italy to the legions on the Danubian limes went along our coast. On the other hand, Ravenna was the key Adriatic port of Northern Italy, of the whole *Gallia Cisalpina*, later the Augustan *Regiones X* and *XI*.

Goods and persons thus travelled, along the islands and coasts of the Adriatic, between Northern Italy and the alpine provinces on one side, and the Eastern Mediterranean on the other. This traffic was a very important component of the wealth of these towns and cities. In Salona, Naron, Iader and Pola we find immigrants from Italy and various western Roman provinces, but also a considerable number of Orientals, either immigrants or slaves, freed slaves and their descendants.

These are two of the three main social groups on the Eastern Adriatic coast in Roman times. The third group is made up of the romanized autochthonous population, the descendants of the Liburni, Delmatae, Histri, Ardiaei, Ollyri etc. The romanization process gradually amalgamated these ethnic and cultural components during the first centuries of the Empire, so that in Late Antiquity we cannot recognise any of the earlier local, or oriental, or Italic feature, except in the most remote interior parts of the province.

After Augustus, with the division of the province of Illyricum into Dalmatia and Pannonia, the latter was the frontier of the Empire on the Danube. The legions and auxiliary troops stationed there were regularly supplied with Mediterranean oil and wine by means of roads that departed from important towns and cities on the coast of the Adriatic: Aquileia, Senia, Salona, Naron. Pola and Iader were two key ports on the route that linked them. Aquileia was undoubtedly the most prominent among them because its land routes to Pannonia were the shortest in comparison with, e. g. Salona, while the road Aquileia – Poetovio – Savaria was more practicable than – for example – the road starting at Naron.

It was not only the long-range commerce that was important for the Eastern Adriatic coast. There were big ships carrying large quantities of grain, wine, oil and other food, but there were also smaller ships for the local trade of goods important for the everyday life of the region. The coastal cities and towns,

colonies and municipia, had all public and private buildings covered with roof-tiles imported from northern Italy.

Stone was and is a very natural building material in the region, geologically formed of soft limestone, easy to be carved into small building-blocks. Clay is present only in very small quantities, and it was as oil and wine amphorae, because they bear the stamp of the owner of the factory that produced them.

Comparing the names stamped on roof-tiles, we see that Istria and Dalmatia imported these products from factories situated on the Italian coast between Ariminum and Ravenna, and around Aquileia. The rich deposits of clay as raw material for the manufacture of pottery, made possible the appearance of a profitable industry in the 1st century BC, a business that was developed in the 1st century AD because of the romanization of Dalmatia. The building activity there reached its highest point during the Flavians, when the inhabitants of most important native settlements on the coast received the Roman citizenship.

Interestingly enough, roof-tiles were not transported into the deep interior of the province, but the trade remained confined inside a zone of 0-20 km from the coast. There is a simple economical reason for this. Using the relatively primitive transport technology of the Romans, it was not profitable for a heavy cargo to be moved by land more than this very short distance, because the cost of the transport severely influenced the final price. The commerce of amphorae too, was facilitated by sea or river lanes, except where legionaries had to be provided with wine and oil on a regular basis, such as in the forts on the Danube.

There is another example: there are clear traces of a commerce of marble sarcophagi from Greece to Aquileia. They were a status symbol and it was possible to import them at a relatively acceptable cost by ship. This trade included Salona, but also Naron, Iader and Pola, harbours along the route. It did not reach into the interior of the province because there were not important towns there whose inhabitants would require such monuments. It did not reach into Pannonia because it would have meant a difficult and costly land voyage.

Istria exported mainly olive oil, not only through Aquileia to the limes, but also by sea to Rome and to the Eastern Adriatic. The main market of the Istrian olive oil, however, was along the Po river. The amphorae travelled on river barges all the way to Augusta Taurinorum – Torino. Wine was not exported in great quantities, also because its quality could not be measured with famous wines from the surroundings of Rome and Campania.

Dalmatia was not particularly famous for the production of olive oil and wine. Its agriculture was certainly self oriented, aiming at feeding its inhabitants. It was particularly important to produce or import enough food for the inhabitants of Salona, whose number might have reached 30000 in the 1st century, but might have been even bigger in the 2nd and 3rd. Salona was the centre of the provincial administration, and it was the seat of the administration of the mines in the interior of today's Bosnia. The continental natural resources (iron, lead and silver) were the real richness of the province of Dalmatia, at least in classical times.

I would not go any further into these considerations regarding the Eastern Adriatic coast in antiquity. The Late Roman period and the Early Middle Ages would require another half hour or more, because the changes then occurred between the 4th and 7th century were fundamental for the whole later history of the region.

Vera Costantini, *ISHA Venice, ISHA-IS, President 1997/98.*

THE SEA OF METAPHORES

It is difficult to talk about an abstract science of metaphors. It is easier and more useful to identify a metaphorical field in a sector of our culture. For the people who do not know the history of Europe, it must be difficult to believe that in the past the Mediterranean countries, now in the suburbs of the "developed" world, were at the avant-garde in the political organisation and cultural formulation. Political attitudes and practises, like democracy and disciplines today still alive, like philosophy, were born on Mediterranean coast. Supplanted first by the Oceanic competition and later by the technological developments, the Mediterranean sea is in our virtual era relegated to tourist and holiday aims, and its only productive function seems to be confined to the world of oil-tankers, carrying crude-oil from the Near-eastern wells to every corner of our planet. And the new European politics definitely witness this lack of attention towards the Mediterranean sea and the coastal countries of the South. But there has been a long period in our history, when the Mediterranean sea, mainly thanks to the trade, made contacts between different people and countries possible. Is history the history of relations? If it is then the sea was in ancient time, during the Middle Ages, and even later on, a privileged place of relations. Ploughed by merchant ships, warships and pirate-vessels for centuries the sea allowed contacts otherwise possible. That's why Tales, who lived on the Turkish western coast, was able to know the Egyptian geometry. Maybe his experience will show, in the next chapter, how difficult it was to define borders between cultures and people.

We can then talk about Mediterranean culture, which is the basis of European culture, and clan a due attention to the countries which, because of their history, need different politics and different development. Nobody can say that the productive model is one and only one, and that every country has to conform herself. Perhaps, what was a world of compatible urbanisation and production could become a good example of nowadays.

Was sea really so important? The proof is the centrality it had on the cultural exhibitions, the vastness of the metaphoric field it represented. An evidently important concept, like that of the State, has been figured used marine metaphors. The same happened to social conflicts and, in other lands and other seas, to the concept of knowledge, as we will see. We will talk a lot about ancient history, not to claim Greek supremacy, but rather to show that what seemed to have been born there actually the result of exchanges and interactions between different worlds. What will become European culture was not born with the appearance it has today, and it has never been, neither in the cities or its development, the culture of everybody. We talk about avant-garde and privileged classes. The metaphor puts in analogy different semantic levels, different periods, literature and disciplines.

The Biological Metaphor

Every manual of philosophy starts in general form from the Greek world, and in particular form the Minor-Asian naturalists. The capacity to get over myth and religion, which is considered the main feature, foments a pretended Hellenic cultural miracle; that's why a science, which is in 6th century BC intended to investigate rational causes of the natural phenomena and tried to find out the principle of the real world, is now the object of a claimed historical primogeniture.

It is maybe true that philosophy, in the way it is thought and codified by Aristotle and by us, found its origins in the city of Miletus, but it is still not proved that the wise Tales, astronomer and geometer, felt as the initiator of a new critical consciousness, the discoverer of the new objects of science. Many of his explanations led evidently to presume the worlds different from that of the Greek-speaking cities and colonies; worlds, like Egypt and Near East, which Tales managed to contact, only for living in 7th-6th century Miletus, an extraordinary cross-roads for goods and cultures, a privileged Mediterranean channel of trade for great and ancient civilisations.

Tales diverted the river Halys, to let Croesus' Persian armies cross it without needing the bridges, predicted the solar eclipse, measured the pyramids' height, speculated on olive-presses. The reason why he became so famous in his general meditation on the so called "principle" (arche): "*The four elements - among which we consider water as the first and in a way unique melt together to constitute the things of the world*". Now the question we have to ask ourselves is the following : why water? If we have a look on the mythology we'll see that Homer in Iliad said that Oceanus and Thetis, both maritime gods, are responsible for the genesis of Gods. It is anyway more useful to underline that Egypt and Mesopotamia, both fluvial civilisations, gave water a great symbolic importance. For them it was symbolised life and regeneration. Which suggestion could have been luckier than that, in a maritime city like Miletus, wealth came from the sea trade? The choice of seeing in water the biological metaphor of the principle has to be explained, first of all in geographical terms.

Was philosophy born in water? With the value we give it today, it was definitely born in the Aegean Sea, but this doesn't mean that it has not presented itself, from the beginning, in terms of a melting pot cultures, knowledge and disciplines different among themselves. And if the vicissitude of Ionic philosophy brings back to its historical relativeness a phenomenon destined to lasted for centuries, if it explodes the myth on the Hellenic miracle, it also helps us to understand that in European history it is useless to talk about pretended supremacy and pretended barbarity.

To explain his analysis, Tales used a metaphor. He chose nature to be the privileged metaphorical field, the pretty metaphorical research of the first constituent principle of the reality. The philosophical research was born naturalistic and metaphorical. He saw earth as an element floating on the water, and earthquakes as an effects of the waves below. Briefly, he saw the entire dry land as a huge boat.

The Political Metaphor

If it is true that the political development of the Greek world, which flowered in the 7th century with an extra ordinary urbanisation, was first of all the Macedonian phenomenon, it is then recognised that the avant-garde role in the field of culture was played by the vast coastal and insular region which is known by the name of Minor Asia. If this research had expected the chronological order, it would have presented, even before Tales and the Ionic naturalism, another important sector of Greek culture: the archaic poetry, which became mature already in 7th century.

To talk about 7th century's Greek poetry is to talk about a narrative form which still saw Homer's poems as linguistic and metrical models. The main difference was that it was no longer a matter of anonymous bards who sang inspired by gods: Ionic-Aegean culture was individualistic. The one who composed the verses was the specific member of a privileged classes, on the scenery of the symposium, the battle field and the gymnasium, their typical meeting places. The receivers of the verses experienced together with the composer, the described experience. The lobby of aristocrats was called *eteria* it has to be considered to be the reference group. It was a kind of institution in between family and State. It was a place of discussion of the older members and of education for the young ones. Its aim was to fight for the government of the city and against other *eterias*. Alcaeus, who lived in Mitilene, the capital of the island of Lesbos was, like all aristocrats, a politician, a sailor and a poet at the same time. As we can see from the one of his famous odes, in the fragment 208a V., which follows the vicissitude of Alcaeus' *eteria*, fighting against the opponents, is represented as navigation of the ship, disturbed by the wind and the waves of a tempest.

"I cannot tell the lie of the wind; one wave rolls from this quarter, another from that, and we are carried in the midst with the black ship, labouring in an exceeding great storm. The water is up to the mast-hole, the sail let daylight through with the great tents that are in it, and in the halyards ate working loose."

(translation by J. M. Edmonds)

The main contrast is between the natural, instinctual element, i.e. the wind and the waves, which represent the opponent *eterias*, and the human and rational one, meaning the ship, meaning the state led by Alcaeus' *eteria*, shown as the only good way to rule the government. The levels are multiple: there is first of all Alcaeus, the poet, who is in the state of general misunderstanding ("*I cannot tell...*"); then there is the plural subject ("*we are carried...*"), and the scenery surrounding underlines the hidden presence of "them", those aristocrats, like Mirsilos and Pittacos, who fought for the tyranny.

Homer had also, describing the assault of the Trojans, represented them like the waves of tempest. The enemies, political opponents, negative side are all seen as waves. Much later, in the 17th century AD, Ivan Gundulić from Dubrovnik, who wrote in Croatian, in his epic poem called "Osman",

spoke of the people of Istanbul in revolt, on terms of terrible waves falling on the sand and destroying it.

Many authors, in almost all periods of our history, have used the metaphor of the ship to represent the State: Aeschylus, Dante Alighieri, Whitman, and so on. I'd only like to present another example, by Horace, in his ode I, 14:

"O ship, new billows threaten to bear thee out to sea again. Beware! Haste valiantly to reach the heaven! Seest thou not how thy bulwarks are bereft of oars, how thy shattered mast and yards are creaking in the driving gale, and how thy hull without a girding-rope can scarce withstand the overmastering sea? Thy canvas is no longer whole, nor hast thou gods to call upon when again beset by trouble. Though thou be built of Pontic pine, a child of far-famed forests, and though thou boast thy stock and useless name, yet the timid sailor puts no faith in gaudy sterns. Beware lest thou become the wild gale's sport! Do thou, who wert no long ago to me a source of worry and of weariness, but art now my love and anxious care, avoid the sea that course between the glistening Cyclades!"

(translation by C. E. Bennet)

The situation is now different: Horace doesn't live in Lesbos, but in Rome in the period just after the civil war between the republicans and Augustus, and is not an aristocrat. Horace is an intellectual maintained by regime. He's employed by the government of his city as long as he cares of his personal subsistence. In fact, his poem does not describe a tempest, and he is not a member of the crew. He stands in the harbour, watching the ship returning from the civil war. The potential dangers for Augustean propaganda are not the opponent eternas but the outsiders, i.e. Antony and Cleopatra in the East. Alcaeus puts his own internees in the State, but Horace does not. He though depending financially upon Maecenas, one of the most important friends of the future emperor, pretended to create a culture totally devoted to the *carpe diem*, totally disengaged.

To conclude this part, it is probably useful to underline that those authors who used the metaphor of the ship thought about in terms of institution, government, and not as a way of representing different ideas, not as the plausible public space to everybody. The course for the ship is one and only one, and it's that which makes possible both the trade for Alcaeus, and building of the disengaged culture for Horace. Every obstacle, people in revolt, opponents and everything else, is compared to the waves, the most instinctual among the symbols which can be found in marine metaphorical field.

The Gnosiological Metaphor

Till now, our maritime metaphors have been floating on the surface of the waves, but if we travel from the Aegean and Mediterranean to the Eastern waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, we notice that the image of the steersman is substituted by that of the driver. The sea is no more a contention

between winds and waves, but field of research, deep psyche. The aim of the man is not to steer a vessel, but to find in the depths, the shell containing the pearl, a mystic symbol of wisdom.

Sa-di Mosarrif, one of the mayor poets of Persian literature, was born in Sciraz around 1184 d. C., in a noble family. *"He lived one hundred and two years. Thirty years he spent learning and becoming a wise man. Thirty years he spent travelling and visiting every corner of the world. Thirty years he spent on the carpet of devotion and ran the way of the mystics."* Davlet-Shah, a chronicler wrote this about him. His poetry is of a moral kind, and proposes, with a spirit not pedant at all, examples of wisdom, humility and tolerance to the human kind which in that period seemed to have forgotten the distance between itself and the wild beasts. It was around 1220, when Sa-di started the journeys of his youth. That the same year the Mongols laid waste the Iranian region. In his mystic and moral poem entitled *Bustan*, one narration is correlated to his doctrine and tells the allegoric story of a drop of water transforming into a pearl:

"A drop of water fell from the bosom of the clouds; at the view of the immense sea, she was all confused: "What I am - she said - next to the Ocean? Telling the truth, I get lost and disappear in his vastness!". In recompense of this declaration of modesty, she was picked up and nourished by the nacre of a shell; thanks to the cares of the Providence, she became a pearl of great value, destined to adorn the crown of the kings. She became great, because she was humble, she obtained the existence because she assimilated herself to the nothing."

The story, commonly known by the name of *Apologue or the pearl*, puts in evidence the Semitic pattern which got into Persia thanks to Arabic texts. In the Koran and the Gospels, the pearl, originated from a drop of water and closed into a shell, gains meanings of angelical perfection, obtained thanks to the transformation. In this context, we notice a feminization of the metaphoric field of the sea. The pearl is a lunar symbol, linked to water and to a woman. Pantheistic sect of Ahl-i-Haqq thought that the mothers of the incarnations of God, all virgins, were called Ramz-bar, which means *"secret of the Ocean"*. This is a part of their cosmogony: *"the beginning of Existence there was no other creature but the supreme Truth, unique, alive and venerable. Its dwelling was in the pearl and its essence was hidden. The pearl was in the shell, and the shell was in the sea. The waves of the sea covered everything."*

In this Eastern tradition, the subjectivity was neither "we" of Alcaeus who proved the tempest from the inside of an institution; nor poetica ego of Horace, who excepted in the sapient self-sufficiency, and looked with axiently to that politic class, that State which permitted his own existence. The Eastern wise man seems alone the mystic path he had to run to conquer his religious or metaphysical aim. Nevertheless, the religious essence of existential research looked for universal public, the whole human kind, not the eteria, not the Augustean *entourage*, but a community metaphysically defined.

The exceptional religious plurality of the East let the society assume extremely complex conformations, senses and belongings which crossed and superposed on divisions of other nature, producing a world which had to be various and different from the European West.

The metaphoric field of the Eastern Sea was not a conflicting place, which had to be crossed by

the ship: it was itself a container. The refer-point in the reality were not the Aegean tempests, but the waves around the island of Kich, were the pearl-fisherman lived.

Lorenzo Calvelli, *ISHA Venice*

THE PHOENICIANS AND THEIR TRADEROUTES.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEA EMPIRE 3.000 YEARS AGO.

History of independent cities

According to tradition, the inhabitants of the coast of Syria and Lebanon had been called Phoenicians since the year 1,200 B.C. First of all it is important to stress that these people did represent a continuity with the previous settlements of this area: they kept on living where their ancestors had lived and they kept speaking the north-westerner Semitic language. This situation was strikingly different from what was happening in the other parts of the eastern Mediterranean coastline: up north, the wealthy city of Ugarit was destroyed by the "sea-people" and never replaced by any new strong installation; in the south, close to the border with Egypt, new people, coming from overseas, had settled down and created a new culture. It is interesting to notice that when referring to the Phoenicians we have to use their greek name (Fotnikez), since they didn't think of themselves as being a nation, but as being citizens of single independent cities. It was a system similar to the Greek one, but even more relying on local autonomies. Geographically, Phoenicia was a long strand lying between the mountains and the Mediterranean, with woods (like famous cedar), bushes and many agricultural resources such as vineyards, olives and cereals. The population was well distributed into villages, each of them referring to a main capital city: Tyrus, Sido, Byblos, Arwad... But what makes this area of the Near East extremely peculiar is the importance that activities of transformation and exchange always had here: from the beginning the wealth of these cities relied on long distance trades and manufacture of products both local and imported from abroad.

As already stated, around the year 1,200 the whole Near East followed a proces of development based on previos local culture. This mutation did not interfere with economy of the coast; this zone had allways been bound to specialized agriculture and long-distance trades, and that had never changed. The arrival of new people in the surrounding regions had increased the freedom of the coastal cities, which found themselves less and less bounded to the great empires of Assyria, Babilonia and Egypt. At the same time, people who lived beyond the mountains changed their political structure towards a form of national state based on the feeling of belonging to the same tribe. Even this mutation did not take place in the coast, where the city-state structure was maintained around the institution of the royal palace.

During the last centuries of the second millenium, cities such as Tyrus kept having strong commercial relationship with Egyptian pharaones as they did before, but the terms of the exchange were enourmously different: Tyrus was no longer considered to be an important city, and it's king knew exactly how important its rule in the economy of Egyptian imports was. According to the Old Testament, the king of Tyrus was also in touch with David and Salómon, cooperating with them in commercial enterprises: the

Phoenician ships would leave from Jewish port Esiongaber, on the gulf of Aqaba, to reach the wealthy land of Hiram in the southern Red Sea. There they would get gold and other metals, and once returned to their departure point they would split their profits with the Jewish king. At the same time the cities from Northern Phoenicia were holding similar relationships with their neighbouring kingdoms, mainly with the Assyrians and the Neo-Hittites.

In the first centuries of the new millennium the Assyrian Empire, after a period of crisis, went through a period of slow but unstoppable expansion: the Phoenician cities one by one entered the Assyrian orbit by paying tributes or by offering specialised manufactures to the emperor. This sort of peaceful policy towards the Phoenicians means that the Assyrians had understood the important role of the maritime cities, and realized how impossible it would be to replace the skill of their sailors and merchants. It was much easier to have them for allies and to benefit from their traditional businesses.

Because of the struggles between the cities themselves, little by little the whole Phoenicia had been swallowed by Assurbanipal's empire, with the exception of Tyrus, Byblos and Arwad. This situation changed neither with the Neo-Babylonian empire nor with the Persian one: still all new rulers left local dynasts on their thrones, and tried to control the economy as much as they could.

The routes of trades

As already stated, a massive change in the economy of the Near East occurred around the year 1,200 when the whole palace-system broke down leaving the field open to private enterprises, less bounded to traditional idea of trade, but also more dangerous because of the increase of piracy. After the fall of the Egyptian and the Mycenaean empires the Phoenicians were free to undertake old routes. A new "scenario" opened to their ships: the Red Sea and the Western Mediterranean, with their huge metal deposits and social complexity much lower than the "eastern" one. In this first period (XI-IX century B.C.) sea trade was performed by the Phoenicians in a very flexible way: ships and sailors left their homeland during summer, they spent winter abroad looking for raw materials and they came back the following summer without needing any halting-place. Dealing with different cultures turned out to be extremely profitable for the Phoenicians who would get what they wanted by giving weapons, jewelry or even glass-beads to the local chiefs.

Phoenician expeditions were also directed to the land of Tarshish, as the coasts of Spain were called, and to Sardinia, both rich in gold and tin. Greek historians date the foundation of the first Phoenician colonies in this period. However, this is definitely too early. The kind of business they were undertaking did not require strong presence on the western territory, nor sea-ports network in their background.

In the following centuries the situation had changed because of two main reasons: first of all, local western cultures, by increasing their contacts with the Phoenician traders, had slowly "developed" their technologies and their own social structure, becoming more exigent with their commercial partners. Some of them, like the Etruscans, even became experts in business and metalurgy. On the other hand, after some centuries of silence, the Greeks became very competitive on the sea-trades field. All this led to

basic division of the Mediterranean into the zones of influence, with the consequent necessity of building new cities and colonies in Spain, Sardinia, but also nearer regions such as Sicily and Tunisia. During the VII century the "whole world" became one single network, with different characteristics from place to place, but basically similar in its cultural and artistic background. One can find similar products made of bronze, ivory as well as clothes and glass products all the way from Spain to Cyprus, Greece to Assyria. Even several literary topics spread very quickly from one nation to the other. The main promoters of this process of "globalization" were undoubtedly the Phoenicians who had the ability of modifying their way of interacting according to the partner who was in front of them. Historians call this period the "period of orientaling" but if we pay some attention to the actual situation we can easily find out that at that time there simply was no west, but just one "eastern" world going from the Atlantic to India with no interruptions.

THE VIKINGS:

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC

Introduction

This paper is talking about the expansion of the Vikings, especially about the discovery of the new countries in the North Atlantic like Iceland, Greenland and North America. Related to the seminar topic, this paper contains almost nothing about the household, the daily life, the settlement or the religion of the Vikings. It is very important to make a distinction between groups of Vikings, which were fighting among themselves. Sources for the expansion of the Vikings are very often the written ones, such as the reports on the monasteries that had been attacked. One has to be very careful when reading the chronicles of some Christian writers, like Adam of Bremen. The chronicles describe the pagan life of the Vikings from the Christian point of view. The most important written source for the expansion in the Eastern Europe is the *Chronicle of Nestor*, written by orthodox monks in the 12 century.¹ The discovery and settlement of the North Atlantic were described in sagas written in Iceland several hundred years after those events actually took place. The sagas were based on the oral tradition, so some historical facts could be mixed up - intentionally or not. Archaeological sources can be found only in those places where the Vikings had established more permanent settlements. In Eastern Europe some archaeological remains, like graves and treasures, were found. Linguistic evidence of the Vikings existence can be seen in those towns in England that finish with "stead".²

This paper is divided into two parts. Part A is a short introduction of Viking history and the sailing conditions. Chapter one is dealing with the Viking navigation based on the descriptions by Jochen von Fircks. Chapter two is about the Viking expansion, destruction and occupation in Central, Western and Eastern Europe.

Part B deals with the Vikings in the North Atlantic. Chapter one is about the discovery of Iceland and some social structures there. The second chapter describes beginnings and daily life in Greenland. Finally, chapter three lead us to the New World, which the Norsemen occupied for a short time. Literature used for writing of this paper includes more scientific works written by Christian Keller, Brigitta Linderoth Wallace (*Acta Archeologica*), and some more popular works, like those written by Erik Wahlgren, Hans Kuhn and Yves Cohat.

¹ Yves Cohat, 62.

² Torsten, Capelle, 109.

Part A: Who were the Vikings?

The Viking Navigation

The Archaeological sources does not tell us whether the Vikings had a compass or not. The sagas describe a sun-stone: the King Olaf of Norway (1015 - 1039) led the stone swim and it glowed in the direction of the Sun and showed the position of the sun by fog, rain and snow. Modern historians say that the glowing of the stone was a fantasy of the saga writers. The stone they imagined as a board of tree with a magnetic stone was a kind of compass known in china since 250 a Ch. Looking for stars which wasn't easy in the bright Nordic nights and looking for the sun was the another way of navigating. The saga tell us that the degree of latitude would be defined by the height of the Sun.

The "solbradt" (sunboard) which the archaeologists have not yet found, should have been used to define the height of the light. Fog or narrow clouds caused a problem to this kind of navigation, so, as the sagas tell us, the Vikings often missed their way and discovered new countries. In summer the Vikings sailed to the distant seas, while in winter they stayed near the coasts.³

The pre-Viking boats were the rowing boats. The sails came into use in the 7th or 8th century. Sailboats, which could reach distant places, not only by human power, were the cause for the expansion of the Vikings. Pictures of Viking ships can be seen on coins. The first type of Viking ships is a big ship with small sail, 14.3 m long, with a capacity of 9000 kilos was used for trade. The second type is smaller and quicker, with better manoeuvre abilities. The sagas tell us that some boats had more than a hundred crewmen, but maybe this number is a little too high. The Bayeux tapestry an important source for the late Viking time, shows the occupation of England by the Normans, and the low draught of Viking ships. So the boats were able to lay up to the countries with no natural harbours. They were able to sail in rivers which were not very deep, and because they were light they could be placed on rollers and moved by crewmen on horses ashore.⁴

The Expansion of the Vikings in Europe

The so-called Viking period began in 793 with the destruction of the monastery of Lindisfarne on the Holy Island (eastern coast of Scotland) and finished in 1066 with the conquest of England. Their leader William became the first Norman king of England. The Vikings first attacked the coastal areas of the Empire of the Franks. From 843 onward they came on boats along the rivers.⁵ Thirty thousand Danish Vikings attacked Paris which was defended by only two hundred cavaliers. The population retreated on the "Ile de la Cite" and defended Paris very bravely. The siege lasted for one year until King Charles freed Paris in 886. He was not able to chase the way the Vikings totally, so they settled in near the river Seine. In

³ Jochen von Fircks, 15 - 16.

⁴ Torsten Capelle, 58 - 67.

⁵ Torsten Capelle, 107.

911 Rollo, the leader of majority of Danish Vikings, was given a part of France, modern Normandy. He became their duke and one of the West Frank nobleman. The Vikings were Christianised and they mixed with the local population. The Scandinavian law disappeared.⁶ Some of the Normans later moved and conquered Sicily and South Italy and, during the Crusades, had founded their own states in the Holy Country. In 1066 they conquered England. At the beginning of the 9th century the aim of the Danish Vikings attack's was the south of England. By the end of the century the whole England between Northern Yorkshire and the river Thames was occupied by the Vikings. This territory was called "Danelaw". The official language was Nordic and they introduced their own axes. Danish Vikings had problems with the Norwegians who attacked them from Ireland, the Anglo-Saxon armies, which remained in the South, and Swedes. The Normans put an end to the Danish period in England.⁷

During the 9th and 10th centuries Swedish Vikings expanded throughout Eastern Europe. The "rus", maybe a Finish name for the Swedish Vikings, began to trade along the rivers Dnjepar and Volga. Important points were Novgorod and Kiev, which became the capital of their state, was founded by the Swedish in the beginning of the 10th century. In 907 the Vikings had reached Constantinople, which they called "Miklegard" (big town) and that was the beginning of war. For political reasons the Swedish leader Vladimir married the doughtier of the Byzantine emperor and became a Christian in 988. The Scandinavian and orthodox cultures were mixed, while the contact between pagan Sweden and Russia was disturbed.⁸

The Norwegian Vikings attacked the North Atlantic. At the beginning they were only occupying and destroying (like Lindisfarne in Scotland, and other northern British islands). Viking settlements from the beginning of the 9th century were only at Faeroe, the Hebrides and the Orkneys. The life on the Orkneys was described in "Orkneyinga saga". Viking archaeological and linguistic sources were found in the Shetlands. The "Shetland-people" are still able to understand the Norwegian language. A big Viking settlement and a few remains of Viking art were found on the main Shetland island. The Vikings founded a colony in Dublin in 836. The Norwegian rule in Ireland finished in 1002, when the Island was ruled by King Brian. Big Norwegian grave-field was discovered in Dublin⁹.

Part B: Special Part. The Vikings in the North Atlantic

The Discovery of Iceland

The first settlers at Iceland were Irish monks. They reached the south coast in 800. The first report on that was written in 825 by Dicuil, a geographer. Between 870 and 880 first Norwegians come from the Faeroe Islands. Naddod's ship, while sailing from Norway to Faeroe; was blown off the course. He discovered the eastern coast and called it "Snaeland" (snowland). Floki Viligardson, who named the Island

⁶ Yves Cohat, 46 - 54.

⁷ Yves Cohat, 54 -57. Torsten Capelle, 110 -111.

⁸ Yves Cohat, 61-69. Torsten Capelle, 117-119.

Iceland, came after Naddod. He couldn't stay there due the lack of food for the animals he brought with him.

The first person who stayed in Iceland was Ingolf Arnason from western Norway in 874 (as mentioned in the sagas). The exact date of his arrival is not certain. The year 874 was mentioned in a source dating from the 12th century, but he may have come in 880 or 885. The period up to 930 was the time when Iceland was inhabited, as described in "Landnambok", written in the 13th century. According to the "Landambok" around 400 people settled there, but the real number must have been even bigger (maybe 15000 or more). They came from Norway, Ireland, the Shetlands and the Faeroes. Some Celtic-Christian women or slaves came to Iceland and brought their religion and culture. The colonisation was finished in 930. The first powerful settlers took more land than they needed.

The "Althing", founded in 930 was a sign of democratic structure in Iceland. It may be said that the Althing was the first parliament in Europe. The model for the Althing and the law of Iceland was Norwegian law. Iceland remained nonmonarchical. The Althing was in session for two weeks every year in the place called Thingvellir in southern Iceland. The only "administrative person" was the law speaker who opened the Althing and read the common law. The constitution of Iceland isn't very clear. It seems that the development of powerful central government was tried to be stopped. The Norwegian influence on Iceland was always strong, but Iceland was never a part or a colony of Norway.¹⁰

The accession in 995 to the Norwegian kingship of Olaf Tryggvason can be considered as the beginning of Christianisation of the Icelanders. Olaf converted two Iceland chieftains in 1000 and sent them home with a priest. The met the others at the Althing. The lawspeaker had decided that all Icelanders, whatever they did privately, must be Christians publicly.¹¹ For example godars, priests or leaders of old Germanic religion and owners of the temples became priests and most of them built churches instead of temples. What was the cause of this decision? Maybe this was the easiest way to spear Iceland from quarrels due to the religion. Maybe the cause was also the economic one. Iceland was, due to her climate, dependent of goods from the Continent. At that time the whole Europe became Christianised. Iceland converted in order not to become excluded. The new religion was very tolerant.

Greenland

Eric the Red had come to Iceland from Norway around 970. He quarrelled with his neighbours about marginal land. Around 938 he was outlawed for three years and sailed to the west. He invented the name Greenland in 986. Maybe he chose this name because the new country seemed so "green" to him, but it is more probable that the name was a part of his scheme to promote the settlement. Returning to Iceland he organised a colonising party. The Saga of Greenland says that 25 ships left Iceland, but only 14 arrived at the Greenland. More settlers followed and two settlements were founded in the Southwest: the

⁹ Torsten Capelle, 111-113.

¹⁰ Hans Kuhn, 18-30.

¹¹ F. Donald Logan, 427.

eastern settlement in the very Southwest, where Eric settled at Brattahild, and the western Settlement four hundred miles away in the north-west. Christianity came directly from Iceland around the year 1000. The first diocese was erected in 1126 at Gardar.¹²

The life in Greenland must have been very hard. The climate was cold and caused the lack of such important things like grain or wood. People of Greenland were exchanging malt, grain, iron and salt for dairy products. Five forges were found which show that it seemed to be possible to extract iron from bog iron deposits. Iron was very important. Some weapons were also found, like knives, axes, fishhooks, harpoons, spear or arrowheads. Bows were not discovered, so we don't know what they were made of. Swords did not seem to be used a lot. It can not be determined how much iron the Norse had, but they got along excellently with implements of wood, walrus, ivory and so on. Wood was almost the only driftwood and it must have been a problem to build big ships. Salt was also rare. Meat was dried, smoked or preserved in sour milk. There was only a small possibility to grow grains. Fishing and whale hunting were very important. The only alcoholic drink was beer, brewed from imported malt - if available. The oil used in lamps was whale oil or rendered lard from seals, which gave light and supplemented the cooking fires.¹³ Christian Keller characterises medieval Greenland as early Medieval type of society. At the same time Northern Europe was living in the period of High Middle Ages, with a central authority, military organisation, towns, market economy, coined money, independent church organisation etc., things that did not exist in Greenland. Furthermore Iceland had no executive power. It was a federation of chiefdoms and structure was brought to Greenland.¹⁴

On Greenland, the Norsemen had their first contact with the native, non-European population. The so-called Eskimos prefer to call themselves Inuit (the People), because Eskimo is an Indian word meaning "eater of raw flesh". The Inuit of the Thule culture immigrated from Alaska during the 11th century and reached Greenland by the 12th century. The Norse clung to Greenland 986 to possibly 1480. Sources for all of that are sagas, which call the Inuit "Skraelings". The word Skraeling meant something like "pitiful wretch". Archaeologists found some Norse artefacts like copper, iron, two items of woollen cloth that can be dated to 1280 using C-14 method. The Viking's opinion of the Inuits did not seem to be very good. The name Skraelings which they give them, is an evidence for that. For the Norsemen it was a strange experience to meet a new race with a very different culture. The Inuits were a mystery and the Norsemen compared them with devils or evil ghosts.¹⁵

What caused the dying out of the Norse culture in Greenland?

The Inuits, who were living in the northern part of Greenland for centuries, were driven south and blocked off the northern hunting grounds. Because of this pressure the Europeans abandoned first the western and later the eastern settlements.¹⁶ The Greenlanders depended on trade with Iceland and Norway. Without trade they could not exist. Due the lack of wood people were not able to build as many ships as they

¹² F. Donald Logan, 427.

¹³ Erik Wahlgren, 82-90.

¹⁴ Christian Keller, 128.

¹⁵ Erik Wahlgren, 14-22.

¹⁶ Erik Wahlgren, 174.

needed. In 1377 the last bishop of Gardar had died. The last Icelandic ship that sailed to Greenland returned home in 1410. The climate became worse. The temperature of the sea dropped at least 3 to 7 degrees causing the creation of icefloes and icebergs.¹⁷ In 1540 an Icelander visited Greenland and saw a dead Norsemen on the beach. In 1721 Greenland was recolonised by Denmark.¹⁸

3. The New World

The Saga of Greenlanders describes how Bjarni Herjolfson, a young merchant, sailed from Iceland to Greenland. he was lost in the North Atlantic. After weeks of drifting his ship arrived to the country which wasn't Greenland, because it had different landscape. He had probably found Vinland (Wineland). They moved further north. The country they found was later called Markland (Forest Land). They also discovered Helluland (Slabrock Land). From there it took them four days to reach Greenland.¹⁹ What saga doesn't tell us is the reason why Bjarni did not explore the new countries, for what he was much criticised in Norway.

The Saga of Greenlanders describes five voyages, the first of which was made a decade later by Leif Erikson. Next voyage was made by Leif's brother Thorvald several years later. He was the first of the Greenlanders to meet the Indians (the Inuit came later to Greenland). Eight Indians were killed, which caused conflict between the explorers and the Indians. Thorvald was killed. Because of the problems with Indians and between the Christian and pagan Vikings, the Norse had never occupied the New World.²⁰

The description of discovery of Vinland was considered a legend for a long time. Brigitta Linderoth Wallace writes that the sagas might contain historical elements, but they are not straightforward accounts of actual events. They belong to oral tradition and were written more than 200 years after the actual events took place.²¹

Recently some archaeological evidences of the Norse settlement at North America have been found. One of them is the famous Kensington stone, which was found at a farm near the village of Kensington in Douglas County, western Minnesota, in 1898. This stone tells the story of eight Swedes and 22 Norwegians who arrived at Minnesota in 1362. Kensington stone was is considered as the most important archaeological item found in North America. Nevertheless, there have been many sceptics who questioned the authenticity of the inscription carved in the stone. One of them, and with very good arguments, was Erik Wahlgren.²²

In 1960 Norwegian explorer and writer Helge Ingstad declared that he had found a settlement in northern Newfoundland nearby the fishing village of L'Anse aux Meadows, 2500 km from the Eastern Settlement in

¹⁷ F. Donald Logan, 427.

¹⁸ Erik Wahlgren, 172-177.

¹⁹ Erik Wahlgren, 91.

²⁰ Erik Wahlgren, 92-94.

²¹ Brigitta Linderoth Wallace, 166.

²² Erik Wahlgren, 98-105.

Greenland. The research evidenced that the site was beyond any doubt a Norse settlement.²³ Why did the Norse settle in L'Anse aux Meadows and not in the more hospitable Gulf? Maybe because the Gulf was additional 700 km away from Greenland and occupied by the natives.²⁴

There are certain similarities between L'Anse aux Meadows and the description of settlements written in the sagas.²⁵

Conclusion

Why did the Norse emigrate to the West Atlantic? Christian Keller suggests that the reason for that was a major political change in Norway, brought about by the transition towards a kingdom and a state. The immigrants were eager to preserve the old social order in a new country.²⁶

The emigrants who arrived at Greenland were often poor, peaceful farmers and not brave warriors who terrified Europe at that time. It is very disappointing that the Greenlanders did not want to stay in the New World. This may be so because, due to a small number of settlers the defence from the "Skraelings" was hard.

What became of the Norse Greenlanders? Some writers think they managed to migrate to Canada. Others that they were massacred by the Inuits.

That is only one of many questions that still remains without an answer.

²³ Brigitta Linderoth Wallace, 166-172.

²⁴ Brigitta Linderoth Wallace, 193-194.

²⁵ Brigitta Linderoth Wallace, 191-193

²⁶ Christian Keller, 128.

Bibliography

1. Torsten Capelle, *Die Wikinger* (1971).
2. Yves Cohat, *Die Wikinger* (1990). (Original Yves Cohat, *Les Vikings, rois des mers* (1987).
3. F. Donald F. Donald Logan, *Vikings*. In: Joseph R. Strayer (ed.), *Dictionary of the Middle Ages 12* (1989), p. 422-437.
4. Jochen von Fricks, *Wikingerschiffe. Über ihren Bau, ihre Vorgänger und ihre eigene Entwicklung* (1979).
5. Christian Keller, *Vikings in the West Atlantic. A Model of Norse Greenlandic Medieval Society*. In: *Acta Archaeologica 61* (1990), p. 126 - 141.
6. Hans Kuhn, *Das Alte Island* (1978).
7. Brigitta Linderoth Wallace, *L'Anse aux Meadows, Gateway to Vinland*. In: *Acta Archaeologica 61* (1990) p. 166-197.
8. Erik Wahlgren, *The Vikings in America* (1986).

THE CHIVALRIC GAMES OF THE ISLAND OF RAB IN THE YEAR 1364

In the rare sources these games are called GIOSTRE (games on horses), PALIE (races), OBDULJE or FERIJJE. Whatever their name was its participants competed in archery with arch or spear, and competitors in middle ages were knights and their shield bearers, or later other competitors replaced knights.

I must mention some sources when talking about this subject. First of all, it is *Kamporska kronika* where it is mentioned that the games were done in year 1364 (probably the first time) on the day of protector of Rab, St. Christopher, July, 27th.¹ In later years they were also done on May, 9th, the day called *Dies Victoriae* when Rab was liberated under the protection of St. Christopher from Normans in the year 1705, as fra Vladislav Brusić², Giuseppe Praga³, Stjepan Antoljak⁴, and Božidar Vidov-Rabljanin were writing.

The games are also directly mentioned in the year 1451, 87 years after they were mentioned for the first time. But, these games in 15th century were different from the one in 1364; they were more like common people party because there were not knights any more and the customs changed. This is why I will try to describe games from 1364 as more authentic games.

By that what is written by now we can say that on Rab there were organised chivalric games or some kind of "tournament" on which the best archers were competing or showing strength and skill in some game. The games lasted several days if there were more participants or if they were organised in "better" times. As in any competition in skills (for example for tournaments), it was celebrating several days by set rules. In this chivalric games ordinary people also could participate from which we can see that they were not some big chivalric tournaments, but for little area of Rab they meant central civilisation event of that time.

Participants came festively on the places where the games were organised with sounds of horns or drums. The "heralds" (the one that called out the rules of game) were calling out the names of participants when they passed near the place where judges and persons of high reputation were. Picturesque clothes of participants, made for that occasion, was set by rules of game and by rules of dressing of that time. The winner of games won merited reward and big reputation in society. This chivalric games took place in part of town called "Varoš", under the ramparts (old walls) of town in front of the Town gate, under the Tower of St. Christopher and the Tower of braves.

¹ fra Odoriko Badurina, *Kamporska Kronika*, sv. I, p. 608 - 609, for the year 1364.

² fra Vladislav Brusic, *Otok Rab*, Zagreb, 1962, p. 39.

³ Giuseppe Praga, *La storia di Arbe in una recente monografia*, Zadar, 1926, p.11.

⁴ Stjepan Antoljak, *Izvori i literatura o prošlosti otoka Raba od ranog srednjeg vijeka do god. 1797.*, Zadar-Rab, 1986, p. 27.

They aimed from arches and the target was probably somewhere under the ramparts of town. Place for the judges and persons of high reputation was on the opposite side of target. It could be somewhere on today's St. Christopher's square or on the place of today's market place.

the reward to the winner was given by the duke.

The games started on the sound of horns or drums with permission of duke. After that heralds were announcing the rules of game, number of participants, the value of reward that the winner will get and some other informations. Since the participants competed with arch and arrow, herald was announcing with what weapon each competitor is competing and if the arrows suited to the rules of the game, or we can say that herald announced informations about weapon, equipment and the earlier success of participants. Participants could only be men of certain age - at least 19 or 21 years. After announcing the winner of games it was celebrating till late that night and about the games people talked long after.

Since this was Renaissance times, celebrations were full of flowers and decoration with numerous flags and festive clothing of nobility and participants. The status of noblemen determined the difference of flags. Wealthier noblemen had big rectangular flags and the one with less wealth had flags with "swallow tail" or with blazing.

There was also flag of Rab's community with figure of St. Christopher. usually flags were kept in Rab's Cathedral and were taken out only in special occasions.

Chivalric games began with procession from Cathedral where the flags of town was taken. When duke, his escort, judges and other nobility came, the procession would depart on the sign of fanfare (trumpet) and drums that were drumming all the way to the place where the games were organised.

Knights were on the head of procession. In front of them were only standard-bearers, fanfares and drums. When they came to the place where the games were organised first on special places would go duke with his escort, judges and other nobility. Then the celebration would start. Drummers, standard-bearers and other players and singers could compete in their skills.

Except for the each arch and arrow on these games participants also used crossbow.

In the decision of Great Council of July 21st, 1364 it was defined that for all fifteen days of preparation and duration of chivalric games this Great Council and the Court would not work (in some sources it was seven days).

These days of chivalric games were the days of reconciliation and few forgiveness of debts on the joint celebration of common people and noblemen, the days when the Town gate were open for everybody but with constant escort of the "Town guard".

Bibliography

1. Ivo Barić, *Rapske viteške igre*. Rab 1995.

THE VENETIAN FLEET. BIOGRAPHY OF A VENETIAN GALLEY

The maritime trade between the East and the West was the main source of wealth for Venice. During the Middle Ages, there were no important military fleets that could stop the Venetian trade. However, in the 15th century the situation changed. The Ottoman Empire and Spain were two very dangerous antagonists, because they had huge human and financial resources. Venice was only a small regional state and fighting against those giants would have been madness.

Therefore, the aim of Venetian policy was to keep the trading contacts especially with the eastern ports. The Republic decided to defend her commercial lines and her necessary ports of call.

Venice believed that the best instrument for this important job was to have the navy always present near the strategic points. The navy, built and managed by the state, was uncommon in the 15th century. The navies of the other states were constituted of privateer vessels and trading ships, but Venice built her the ships, appointed the captains and paid the crews. Therefore, Venice did not have admirals as famous and independent as Sir Francis Drake or Andrea Doria, but serious and loyal admirals like Girolamo da Canal, Sebastiano Venier and Agostino Barbarigo.

The ships used by the Venetian navy during the 15th century were the thin galleys. They made up a few hundreds of galleys. It was not a new type of ship, because it had been utilised since the Middle Ages, but it was still a suitable mean in the Mediterranean Sea, calmer and less windy than the ocean. The other Mediterranean navies had similar galleys, and the Venetian galley was often copied. If you remember the pictures of the Battle of Lepanto, you will have a summary idea of what the galley is, and some witnesses of her diffusion.

The subject of this paper is a sort of biography of one thin Venetian galley, built in the 15th century. I am going to explain her history from her construction to her demolition. Like in all biographies there is not only the protagonist, but I am also going to describe all kinds of people who built and used her, and name the places she went to.

Anyway, I think that the best way to begin is to get to know our protagonist. The thin galley's length was about 40 meters and her width was no more than 5 meters. She was called a thin galley in order to be distinguished from a big galley, which was able to carry wares, while the thin galley had only a military function, and in her small hold there was only food, water and obviously weapons. The draft was limited, not more than 1.5 meters, so the hull was much tapered, suited to offer little resistance to water. It is not necessary to trouble with physical laws to understand that this type of hull is not suited for a stormy sea and that it is not very easy to manoeuvre the sails. Indeed, there was only a mast, for which only the Latin sail was used. If there was wind, they would use sail, but the galley was a ship regarded a powerful human engine.

The galley slaves (but this is an incorrect translation of the Italian word *galeotto*, because Venice

did not employ slaves, but free people or those condemned to a galley) stayed upon the deck divided along two lines. Three rowers were sitting on a thwart, and each of them had one oar (that is where the origin of the word *trireme* comes from). One line had 25 thwarts, so there were at least 150 rowers. The oar length was 10 meters, and only one third stayed inside the ship. Therefore, they had to apply the ballast of lead on the inner part to balance the weight. On a poop there were the helm, the compass and the man who gave the rhythm to the rowers. The poop, although not wide, was generally divided in a few rooms. The most important room was the armoury where about 60-80 arquebuses were preserved. The captains often liked having decorated poops, with carved gilded wood, and so there were laws of cutting down on those expensive and useless decorations. Under the deck there were probably the captain's cabin, the bilge, the storeroom, the room where ill rowers would stay, and the store of the replacement materials. The artillery was placed on the prow, and it was constituted of one culverin and four other small guns. Nevertheless, there was a serious problem. If they had carried too much on the prow, it would have sunken and the water resistance would have been decreased. The prow had the rostrum, very useful to ram enemy ships, an ancient battle technique still used in the 15th century.

The cruising speed of a thin galley was 3 knots, but they were able, near the enemy, to arrive at 7 knots. If they had a propitious wind, the speed would rise to 12 knots.

The story of a Venetian galley began in the eastern Alps woods. Here the government had reserved some big forests for the Arsenal needs. The Mediterranean lacked in good woods for making ships. So the Republic of Venice had started a policy of regulating the forestal exploitation. The trees were cut according to the standard of leaving a forest enough time to reproduct. The woods were sent by the great rivers of the Venetian plains. From Cadore's forests, larches and fir-trees came, and they were used for the planking. The Cansiglio's beeches furnished the oars. The helm was made up by helm-trees(sic). The walnut was non-essential, but appreciated in the captain's cabin. However, the most important and the most precious wood was the oak-tree. The oak was necessary for the principal structure and in particular for the bent elements. Therefore, seeing the Arsenal's indications, the young oak-trees were bent to have the wished forms.

The Arsenal of Venice had big stores, where the woods were piled up. The wood was very encumbering, but there were other big stores for other essential materials. The hemp came from Montagnana, a Venetian land, but there was also large importation from Bologna. From this hemp the factory called La Tana, near the Arsenal, produced every type of cordage. An important residue produced from this work is tallow. Tallow with pitch was used to waterproof the hull between the beams. Pitch was produced at Kotor (Cattaro) and Vlorë (Valona). The wood tar was spread to complete the impermeability. Another waterproof substance was ox fat.

The sails were made up of fustian, but it was the only element of galley that the Arsenal ordered and did not make.

Iron came half worked from Villach and Brescia's mounts, and was used for arquebuses and other accessories. From Central Europe Venice imported tin and copper, fused in bronze, because with bronze Venice's artillery was still made.

The production, as I have alluded before, was concentrated in the Arsenal of Venice. This was a great military factory, where all the material destined for war was produced. The guilds had the control over the production. The Republic of Venice's Arsenal was comprised of 250 000 m², it was surrounded by a big wall, and the Republic bought the materials mentioned above. However, the masters of the guilds were jealous of their technical knowledge and their autonomy. We have the names of the important naval engineers, who had serious projects, but the old galley trireme was not built using theoretical analysis. The masters had learnt some practical rules that explained them the relations between various elements. Therefore, they knew where they had to put the mast and how to make the curvature of the hull. Nevertheless, if the master ordered to begin the work without the engineers, the galley would be built without any theoretical analysis and it was too difficult to mortify the ancient relations known by secular and oral experience. The Arsenal was the biggest factory in Europe for many centuries. In case of emergency 3000 people could work there. The organisation of work could seem chaotic to our rational eyes, because we are the sons of the industrial revolution. However, the Arsenal was almost able to produce galleys in mass production.

The carpenters under the master's direction built the hull, then the coulters made it waterproof. Then the galley could have been lodged in covered hangars, and finished if there was an alarm. However, we do not expect the alarm, we imagine that our galley was immediately manned for the ordinary fleet. The galley passed near the Arsenal's stores and than received the mast, the sail, the oars, the artillery and the supplies. Now, she was ready to navigate. However, not every galley could have been made up well, because some galleys went only as far as Chioggia and they immediately had to return to be repaired or even disassembled.

The "main council" had chosen the captain, called *sopracomito*, much before the launch of the galley. He had to be a member of this main council, the assembly of the Venetian aristocracy. So he was a noble man and popular men could not become captains, although they were good mariners and more experts than the nobleman. So the captain brought himself three or four nobleman, who could become captains after his death. Before main council's nomination, he had to spend four years on a galley to learn secrets of his profession. However, it was not necessary to have technological knowledge, because there were good pilots that did their job very well. Therefore, he had to be authoritative and inspire respect and devotion in his men. Moreover, on a small ship, where 250 people lived, those were fundamental virtues.

When the galley was almost ready, the captain came to Piazza San Marco, and sitting on a desk near the Palace of the Doges, he enrolled the rowers. To be a rower was a hard job, not well paid by the government, so the volunteers were poor people. Venetian people preferred leaving this work to foreign men, who often were the Greeks and the Dalmatians, whom where appreciated for their resistance. The rowers, before the shipment received four months salary, but they often had a special bonus from the captain, because it was difficult to complete the ranks. If there were not enough rowers in Venice, the galley would sail with only two rowers on a thwart, and then they get the third man in Dalmatia. The captain had many extra expenses he had to pay without knowing whether the government would have repaid him at the end of his mission. Nevertheless, the noblemen considered being a captain an honour

and they did not want to seem niggard. However, during the navigation, far away from Venice, they could revenge themselves for a big bonus they had to pay for the rowers' enrolment.

The galley embarked a company of soldiers, about 60-80 men. The soldiers came from detachments of the Venetian army. They were mercenary soldiers, commanded by mercenary captains, because, although Venice's nobility was jealous of their role in the navy, nobility was not interested in making careers in the army.

Venice preferred to use volunteers and not slaves such as the Turks. But the need for rowers was very high. Therefore, they employed criminals who were condemned to oar. Those men were dressed in grey, their hair and their beards were cut and they were tied to the thwart with a chain.

When the crew was completed, the galley left Venice to reach one of the Venetian squadrons of galleys. There was a squadron in the Adriatic Sea, one in the Ionian Sea, and two small detachments based on Cyprus and Crete.

They sailed near the coasts, because they had to stop many times, to provide the ship with water, wood and food. In addition, it was safer being near the coast because the sea is less stormy there. The fear of a wreck forced the ships to go to a port during difficult weather conditions and during the winter the navigation was completely hung.

A day on a galley started at dawn when the rowers begin to row and they continued rowing until five p.m., when they had their dinner. However, they did not row all day, since only one quarter rowed while the other part rested. They set down seeing the poop and hearing the rhythm given by the officer.

They did two strokes, took a breath and then began again. When there was a favourable wind they did not row. It seems that the crew rowed only one quarter of the journey.

A crew composed of 250 men had to be provided with punctuality. In Venice, there was a big factory of ship's biscuits, the principal food of mariners. In addition, every base and port of the Venetian territory had one oven baking biscuits for the fleet. They had to buy great supplies of wheat, a good very precious in the Mediterranean Sea during the 15th century, and Venetian territories did not have enough wheat for themselves. Like the civil population, the sailors risked suffering of hunger, or they had to eat stolen or vermicolous biscuits. They ate also soups with rice and beans, wheeze and boiled hog; they drank water and wine, a good suppliers of calories.

Without energy, rowing was impossible. Various diseases, caused by a poor diet, could kill the crew and the galley would become inoperative. However the captain, in order to recover the money that he had spent to pay the crew, often speculated on rations, or he sold a part of the food to the mariners. Sometimes he did not have any money and so he used his galley as a trading ship and the galley could also become a floating market. There were some cases where the crew sold some parts of the galley, and asked Venice the spare ones.

It was a hard life, because half of the condemned rowers died or could not row after only one operative turn. However, the crew was not always on the ship. A lot of time was spent in Venetian ports. Here they had to search for food and water. Obviously, they did not have good relations with local population, because they stole the poultry and their women. Moreover, this helps explaining the small

interest of the local population in defence problems and the low prestige of the Republic of Venice among them. Sometimes the crew did not have tents and they stayed in the rain and then died on land, not at sea. I have explained these logistical problems to give you an idea of the great problems created by a galley. If this estimation is correct, seven months of service of a galley cost as much as her construction, and officially, she had only a military function. In addition, at peace a galley had some other important roles. It could carry the Venetian authorities to far off places. It controlled civil navigation and fought against pirates, a great and continuous menace to the Venetian trade. However, the principal aim was to observe the activities of the Ottoman navy, the great Venice's enemy.

The thin galley, if in a good operative condition, was a good instrument of the Venetian power. The Venetian galley did not scare the Ottoman vessels; the difference was the size of the fleet, not its quality.

Fast and small Usocchi's ships could make fun of the Venetian galley. The Usocchi were people who lived in Dalmatia working as pirates, and the Venetian galley could not follow this type of ship between the narrow passages and the Islands of Dalmatia. This coast was so dangerous that during the night a galley preferred staying further away.

The strategic situation was changing. Venice in the 16th century lost the supremacy over the Mediterranean Sea to Spain and the Ottoman Empire. However, her galleys were a good means for defending her territories. Nevertheless, at the end of that century, English and Dutch vessels began their incursions and this determined the decay of Spanish, Ottoman and Venetian navies. It was not only the economic power that caused this decay. It was also a problem of means. The new northern ships had powerful artillery and they used only the wind's push with new system of sailing. This situation represented the end of the galley's career, too slow and too poorly armed.

I think that it is a meaningful observation that Venice did not find a real substitute for the thin galley and I believe this to be a symptom of the Venice's decay. A state not interested in improving her fleet, is a state that has renounced not only military, but above all commercial policy of supremacy.

One galley's mission lasted about three years and often after this long period of time the galley returned to Venice, the captain finished his assignment and the crew was discharged and they expected their money from the government.

The galley was disarmed. With that, this kind of biography of one thin Venetian galley finishes.

CONDEMNED TO ROW ON A GALLEY. LIVING CONDITIONS ON THE VENETIAN GALLEYS AND LEGAL REFORMS DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE 16TH CENTURY

The wartime galley was considered to be the most efficacious maritime weapon, causing fear to enemy vessels of minor capacity. However, after having studied the nucleus of its function, it is more likely for a person to think that it provoked greater fear to the men serving on it.

Of course it was not the case with captain, secretaries, mariners, soldiers and craftsmen of the galley. Those who suffered the intensity and the hardship of the service were galley-slaves, i.e. the oarsmen, who made approximately the two thirds of the crew.

These men, the free ones as well as those chained to their benches, were the main engine of this manpowered war vessel. It seems ironical to characterize men who spent months on the bench as being free, because the only freedom they had was the right to go ashore whenever the galley "docked" for supplies. A great number of them used to flee, escape, leaving behind a life of misery, filthiness and fatigue. The percentage of runaways was a considerable one, being after all one of the reasons which forced the Senat to accept the establishment of the *galee de condanati*, galleys manned by convicts.

Other Mediterranean sovereignties had already exploited this source of potential oarsmen from the beginning of the 16th century. In Venice the decision was made in May 1545, after a long debate that lasted approximately three years. The one who introduced the idea was Cristoforo de Canal, the first to be appointed *governator delle galee de condanati* and later *proveditor general da mar*, the highest fleet service. The always unready Venetian state was once more extremely reluctant to give into novelty, proudly asserting that its naval predominance was established on the galleys rowed by free oarsmen. Five or ten years later Venice found the *condannati* practise quite efficient and increased the number of the convict galleys up to the point when they comprised half of its regular fleet.

The reasons why Cristoforo de Canal wanted to introduce the changes were the following:

- the progressively augmenting difficulty in raising the vital crews for the war galleys during the second and the third decade of the 16th century
- the frequent desertions of oarsmen who found the life on the galley unbearable
- the lack of discipline among the free oarsmen when the galley was in trouble (they left their benches causing unrest and panic, as da Canal mentioned)
- the economical factor: the convicts would not receive any salary
- and above all, the sentenced men would have a much longer service and could be easily manipulated by their commander in any way.

Apart from introducing this type of galley manning, Cristoforo da Canal's first impressions and proposals after having spent two years on the first *galera de condannati* also seem interesting. In spite of

the new galley's advantages, he did not turn a blind eye on the harshness the convicts had to go through. So, after completing his term of office in 1549, he presented his report to the Senat. It consisted mainly of the proposed reforms regarding the chained oarsmen's conditions of life.

De Canali pledged that the duration of sentence should be reduced, so that no one of fifty years of age or more should serve on a galley, because from then on one would be more or less incapable to row, being extremely vulnerable to fatigue, disease and finally death. So, after their fiftieth birthday, the convicts should have had the opportunity to find a replacement, e.g. a slave whom they bought.

The duration of the sentence should be exactly set, not prolonged in any way, creating thus a motive for fairly executed service.

De Canali was also interested in the convicts' nutrition and clothing. This is why he suggested the creation of a reserve fund (two thousand ducats per year) and a deposit of clothes in Corfu (the base of the fleet) so that every convict could replace the rags he was wearing after long months of patrolling on the sea.

The *governatore delle galee de condannati* should be the only responsible for the matters related to the convicts' well being and those matters should be exempted from the higher officers' jurisdiction, because only the *governatore* could really know the needs and how to meet them.

At the end of his term every commander of such a galley should have the authority to liberate two convicts in order to elicit greater efficiency and better attitude.

De Canali concluded his report with a final request: only those noble-men who wanted to serve the *signoria* and perform honourable deeds should be appointed commanders of the convict galleys, while those who wished to make a fortune robbing the supplies intended for the *sforzati* (another word used for the men in chains) should not.

The legislative bodies of Venice took de Canal's proposals under consideration. Anyhow, due to the impressively good results produced by the chained crews, the authorities wanted their decision to increase the number of the convict galleys, hence the number of *condannati*.

It was as early as the 25 May 1545 that the Senat addressed the decision to all the officials and magistrates of the occupied territories and Venice itself, giving them the right – rather exhorting them – to convert the death sentences to the service on a galley. Later, in August 1554, the Council of Ten called them to reinstate the proper discipline avoiding to convert the galley sentence (among the others) to fees.

However, on 15 January 1559 the Council of Ten also deliberated that the maximal galley sentence would be twelve years. The decision was not respected. Even in the 17th century, when the maximal sentence was reduced to ten years, in most cases the galley-slaves continued to row long after their penalty time had expired, sometimes till death. Along with their obligation to row the convicts were charged with a debt which had to be settled on the day of their liberation. The debt never remained stable: new fees were added to the initial amount after every misdemeanour executed by the convict. Of course, there was the possibility that the initial debt could not be settled, so the condemned could not be released.

In such a way the Venetian authorities tried to set a hand upon every potential *rematore* (oarsman), guilty even of petty misdeeds. The method was simple. They gave the officials a wider range of

authorities, so they could condemn even soldiers of the Republic or free oarsmen to the galley.

For example, in 1577 in the commission handed to the newly elected *provveditore della fortezza di Suda in Crete* one can read that he could sentence the disobedient soldiers to the eighteen-month galley service. A term of twelve days was given to the accused soldiers to lodge an appeal to the regiment of Canea or to the *provveditor general di Candia*.

In another case, in 1602 a *galeotto di libertà* was condemned to three years "*a servir come homo da remo*" for having stolen a boat in Cefalonia.

This brings us to the question who actually were those *galeotti di libertà*. There were men who chose to row on a galley as their profession, but those became fewer and fewer. They were mainly recruited in the areas like Bohemia. However, before and after the use of the *condannati*, most of the rowers were drawn from the peasant population of Terraferma, Dalmatia and Candia (Crete), especially in an extraordinary situation (war or threat of war). These men did by no means willingly enlist themselves to the Venetian fleet. Their recruitment was based on a large scale conscription applied by lottery to men already registered in lists containing the ones capable of the service. In Crete, whenever the Venetian officials went out to the villages to collect them, the rowers ran off to the mountains to avoid being sent to a galley. It is no wonder why in March 1570, in a period when galleys badly needed them, Filippo Bragadin, *capitano general di Candia*, wrote to the Senat that it was almost impossible to find *galeotti*. Twenty two years later Filippo Pasqualigo, *provveditor dela Canea*, reported that the men chosen for rowers refused to obey so he had to arrest them and bring them by force to Canea. Later in his report Pasqualigo disclosed the whole procedure. After the men had been arrested, they were confined to warehouses or churches. If 50 or 60 of them were gathered, they handcuffed them in pairs and drove them to the navy yard.

Although the second convict galley, launched in 1546, was half manned by the Cretans, it seemed that the practice was abandoned in Crete. Even since 1549 de Canal urged the Senat to send the *galee de condannati* to spend the winter in Crete (forcing in a way the local regiment to keep up the practice), because when these galleys were away, the officials preferred to pronounce the penalty of *angarie alle fabriche* or penal servitude to the public constructions.

In order to explain this attitude one should consider many facts.

First of all, the relation between feudal masters and peasants was unbearable due to the ruthless demonstration of masters' power upon the people working on their estates. So, the villains were under pressure which often transformed into riots. The last of the long series of revolts took place in 1525 when the whole province of Canea was occupied by rebels.

And still there were big families, whose members were free of feudal obligation, who found obeying a very difficult task.

The fortifications were never finished and as the Turkish threat increased, Crete was more and more in need of stronger and technically superior fortifications. So, the penalty of *angaria* was a very useful one. Let us not also forget that the galley commanders sent to Crete were asked to contribute (on the crew's expense, of course) to the completion of a castle tower or moat.

Last but not least, the Venetian authorities refrained from applying the galley-slave's sentence,

because the Cretan population had already suffered a lot of casualties – the peasants as rowers, the townsmen as *uomini da spada*.

Maybe that is the reason why in Zadar (Zara) the *rettori* of the area (also suffering from the involuntary conscription of *galeotti*) permitted those condemned to two or three years on the galley, to have a slave to do their obligation. The Venetian Senat reacted immediately mainly because the slaves bought for replacements were Turkish subjects, who under the conditions of the pacts signed between Venice and the Ottoman Empire should not serve on the Venetian galleys.

It might had taken a long time for Venice to adopt the convict galley, but it had taken her a much longer to drop it. Venice could not adjust to the new era of naval warfare. It kept on using galleys although the galleys were almost useless in comparison with ships with side-loaded cannons. The misfortune of the *sforzati* could – as it seems – in no way be reason enough for reform.

Igor Duda, *ISHA Zagreb*

GALLEY-SLAVES:

SAD ADRIATIC STORIES FROM THE 17TH CENTURY

Eastern Adriatic Coast as the Condition of Venetian Existence

It is well known that from the end of the 11th century Venice has become the most important sea power, in both military and merchant sense. Thanks to its position on the coasts of northern Adriatic, it was secure from sudden attacks coming from the open sea, but in the same time it was also close enough to the mainland which provided it the role of the most convenient port for a big part of Europe. Though the whole Adriatic Sea was named *Golfo di Venetia*, after the famous town on the lagoons, the story does not finish here. If the republic wanted to leave its gulf, which was indispensable for the trade with Levant or other Mediterranean regions, it would need something more: a sea-way safe from pirates but also from the wild sea nature itself. The choice was limited by ship characteristics and technical equipment of that time. So, the best way in and out was the eastern Adriatic coast. Thanks to its islands, bays, channels and peninsulas, it guaranteed (or should guarantee) the safety of sailing. Venetians simply had to conquer eastern Adriatic towns. They also had ideas about their overseas neighbours' new occupation.

During the 10th century Istrian towns were becoming more and more dependent on Venice and its trade.¹ Treaties which were made, brought to them many obligations and among them the one of arming and manning the galleys or just giving rowers. The town which struggled for its freedom at the longest was Pula. After the first agreement made in 1145, Pula had to equip one galley when Venice went to a war with fifteen. It was not easy at all to perform the duty because the whole fleet had to be on alert constantly and in the same time towns had to keep small military ships for their own defense and chasing the pirates. That is why in 1328 the delegate of Pula begged exemption because of *gravibus polensium condictionibus*.² The final treaty made in 1331 did not mention the arming of galleys because then they simply had to do it as Venetian subordinates, without any special request. The same happened with other towns, too. The frequency of the duty was not certain, but no matter how rare or often it was, it was always hard to perform. Pula begged exemption in 1351 again, but twelve years later it had to give 25 rowers. However, sources do not mention a special galley any more.

What does it mean *to arm the galley*, anyway? The ship could be owned by the town or, under special circumstances, given by Venice. The town had to provide all the equipment for sailing and fighting, food, money compensation and the crew, of course. The crew was made of rowers (who were also fighters), ballisters, gunners, officers and a captain (*comito*) elected for a five years period.³

¹ See: D. Klen, *Šćavunska vesla*, 1986, p. 35-37.

² Ibidem, p. 44.

³ Ibidem, p. 42.

Eastern Adriatic Coast as Sanctuary for Miserables

Only a small part of Croatia, known as *Reliquiae reliquiarum olim inclyti Regni Croatiae*, succeeded to stand the Turkish invasion till the beginning of the 17th century. However, the attacks started few centuries earlier and caused a round of changes among which the demographic ones are the most indelible. Thousands of people had to leave their homes and the nearest safe haven was the Adriatic coast, mostly its northern part.

In 1493 *Jakov Vitulović*, an old man from the area near the river Una⁴, begged the representatives of the royal authority for exemption from his duties and taxes because Turks had conquered a part of his property.⁵ His requirement was fulfilled and he was free of duties for twenty years. What happened afterwards to him or his descendants we do not know. Maybe they were forced to go away like the mass of those anonymous people. Have they come in contact with galleys as natives in the seaside have or have they finally found a *piece of happiness*? There are much more confirmations in favor of the first possibility.

*Nikola from Modruš*⁶ came to Sovinjak in northern Istria. He bought a house and vineyard but in 1542 he had to go to a galley. When he came back home ten years later, he found his mother who was captured by Turks when they were leaving Modruš. She was all he had at that time, because his father and brother died and because he had to struggle for his new property again.⁷

Newcomers were welcomed in Istria and the north Adriatic islands (Cres, Lošinj, Krk) because of the lack of population: diseases, wars and galleys did their job properly. Therefore in 1645 Venice decided to stop taking rowers from Istria, though the decision was never respected. Ten years later the town of Osor on Cres offered exemption from galley-duty for a hundred years for everyone who will come to live there in next five years period.

How to Become a Galley-Slave?

The answer to that question is very simple. In short: usually one had to be a healthy man from 16 to 70 or, in more peaceful times, from 25 to 40 years old.

According to the way in which they became Venetian rowers⁸, we can differ six types of galley-slaves⁹:

⁴ Today Una is the border between Croatia and north-western part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁵ For his request see in: N. Klaić, *Izvori...*, 1972, p. 358.

⁶ A region in the central mountain part of Croatia.

⁷ D. Klen, 1986, p. 156.

⁸ D. Klen, 1959, p. 282.

⁹ The English expression for *galeotto* (Italian) or *galijot* (Croatian) is galley-slave, though all "galley-slaves" legally were not slaves. In fact, those who came to galley as slaves or convicts were in great minority. Maybe it would be better to use the expression *galley-rowers*.

1. **Galley-conscripts** who went to a galley as Venetian citizens and subordinates when it was demanded and stayed till Venice wanted them to stay. The basis for recruiting were lists of people made in local communities.
2. **Galley-convicts** who had to stay on a galley as long as the judgment said and to row shackled. This possibility was legalised in 1542. In 1721 it was decided that convicts would be the only rowers left on galleys but the decision was never respected.
3. **Galley-renters** were hired by special agents and paid by Venice.
4. **Galley-renters** or so called *zontaroli* who went to a galley as hired substitutes for a conscript, a group of conscripts or for the entire municipality.
5. **Galley-prisoners** were very rare and usually prisoners of war.
6. **Galley-slaves** (in a limited sense) were also seldom found.

The Listing of Conscripts

Lists of people (*rodolo, ruodolo*) whose duty was to row on a galley can be found in the sources from the end of the 15th century, but the only preserved registers are those from 1661 and 1662 from Cres.¹⁰ What was happening during the registration days and how was the list made?

Listing, the most common way of collecting rowers, was including men usually from 18 to 50 years old. It was not always easy to find out the candidate's exact age, even for the judges, because birth registers were still in beginnings. People's representatives (*deputati populi, sindici, procuratori*) used to visit the houses in their villages trying not to skip anybody. Once finished, the list had to be checked and purged by the municipal chancellor who divided people into groups (*polizza, squadra, zatta*) and prepared everything for the lotting. It was the time when candidates were trying to find reasons why they should not go to a galley and doing everything they could to prove their disability. The number of groups corresponded to the number of rowers which had to be gathered, but in the same time the order of going on galleys in the future, when it would be requested, was established among members of a group. The lotting was mostly made with short sticks or shreds of paper, in a public place (town lodge) in front of the people. Next to the name of the extracted rower, the chancellor was writing down *tocco*, his personal marks or notes about his age (*de prima barba, di mezza etta*).

Already in 1537 the Venetian Senate has warned of the registration misuses. Only physical disability or social and economic reasons could provide exemption from rowing. The illnesses which were usually mentioned are deafness, toothlessness, open sores, arthritis but the most frequent was hernial trouble.

One was happy when he could find another rower to substitute him. In 1646 *Stipan Pohmijević*

¹⁰ The Cres archive has lists from 1661 and 1662 for Mali Lošinj, Osor (with villages Ustrine, Sv. Jakov, Nerezine, Tersić) and Cres (with villages Dragozetići, Sv. Martin, Lubenice, Beli). D. Klen, 1986, p. 124.

went to a galley instead of *Ivan Volarić* from Vrbnik on Krk and got 590 libras for that.¹¹ The usual price was 200-250 libras, so it was really a good job for *Stipan* (or better to say, for his family because it is not sure whether he ever came back). Only wealthier people were able to find such replacements, but the payment often caused misfortune even to them. To collect the money they were selling practically all they had: vineyards, cattle, sometimes even their house.

In 1661 the administrator of Cres freed a number of conscripts from rowing simply because they had been freed from it before. Blacksmith *Gašpar* (from Nerezine on Cres) was exempted because he worked for the commune and because his father died on a galley. His fellow-villager *Nikola Bukonjić* was saved by offering to transport letters to Dalmatia by his boat. *Lovre Đuras* offered on 16 December 1696 to do blacksmith works for Cres commune. His asking was not accepted until 6 April 1699.¹²

There were not so many options for the poor. Trying to avoid rowing young men from Krk were becoming priests but they still continued to work on the land with their parents. The only solution for the others was to run away. After that, they (actually, their family) had to be fined by depriving the property but they were usually so poor that nothing was left behind.¹³

Departing to a Galley – Departing from Life

Once the lotting was finished, there were only few days left before leaving. The most important concern for the authorities was how to prevent a future galley-rower from running away. Without doubt it was of great importance to members of his group, too, because in the case of escape someone of them had to replace him. Those who became reconciled with destiny, used their last days at home for writing testaments and saying goodbye to everyone and everything they had – not rarely it was their final goodbye.

Matij Pipinić from Vrbnik on Krk decided to visit the local notary on 6 May 1645 and say his last will. The reason is clear: he had to go to a galley and he did not know *neither the moment nor the hour* of his death.¹⁴ He recommended his soul to God, but he did not know to whom should he recommend his body because he could not be sure whether he would die on the dry land or at sea. *Matij* left everything he owned to his son.

Matij Lahović, also from Vrbnik, came to the same notary on 11 May 1645. He wanted his last will to be written down because he must go to a galley and he did not *know whether the death would catch him during the journey*.¹⁵ His testament was shorter and much more practical: he left everything to his father but did not forget to mention all that other people owed him.

¹¹ The source is *Stipan's* testament. Ibidem, p.198.

¹² For *Gašpar, Bukonjić and Đuras* see in: ibidem, p. 133.

¹³ In 1669 the administrator of Cres replies to *provedidor Priuli*: "... sono si miserabili che salvando se stessi, altro non gli resta dietro..." Ibidem, p. 141.

¹⁴ The testament is written in an old type of Croatian chakavian dialect: "*Budući tu prišal Matij Pipinić, proseći me, da mu pišem njega tištament, zač ga biše tukalo na galiju z družimi ljudmi. I ne znajući časa ni ure, kadi mi se primiri smart i za to činim moj poslednji tištament, neka doznaju moji, kim ostavljam.*" R. Strohal, 1910, p. 157-158.

¹⁵ "*Pred rečenimi svedoci budući tu prežento prišal Matij Lahović, ki rečeni me prosí, da mu pišem za njega jedan at od kundecil, da ima pojt na galiju, a ne zna, ako mu se primiri smart na rečeno(m) puti.*" Ibidem, p. 158.

Finally on the Galley

Life conditions on the galleys are well known: lack of food and clothes, cold, battles, unknown service duration, weakness and exhaustion, death.¹⁶

How many people from Istria and Dalmatia were on galleys? The exact number will be never known, because beside the legal collecting of rowers, there were cases when people were taken by force. Not to mention that all galleys coming from Venice with lack of rowers had to be filled along the eastern Adriatic – it was usually one third of the crew (*interzar delle galee*). In 1570 Istria gave 430 rowers,¹⁷ in the Battle of Lepanto more than one sixth of men and galleys were from Istria and Dalmatia. In 1625 Cres had to collect 145 rowers for its galley and give another 90 men for the galley of Krk. No wonder that in 1688 the council of Cres had to express its concern because there were not enough people for cultivation and cattle-breeding anymore. It is clear, while men were rowing on galleys, their households were decaying and often torn apart.

To Remain or to Desert: Few are Coming Back

Deserting from galleys was very common and, looking from the rowers' position, absolutely justified. Though, by doing it galley-rowers were starting an outlaw life which usually brought more uncertainty than the one on galleys.

The biggest escape happened in 1605 from Antonio Loredan's galley, which was sailing from Venice to the Levant and stopped in Koper in north-western Istria. While Loredan and noblemen from the galley were in town, rebelled galley-rowers killed the officers who stayed on the ship and sailed toward Trieste. The galley was found later with only 12 convicts and 3 conscripts. It came out that the rebels took only a small amount of money and went to Trieste. The money was taken away from them there but a hundred of deserters were allowed to go. Only one was caught when he came home to Motovun in Istria.¹⁸

What could happen to those who returned home regularly? In 1676 the conscript *Martin Donatis* came back to Šibenik in Dalmatia after 33 years spent on a galley. Other members of his group were supposed to cultivate his soil and watch it while he was gone, but they did not so it was usurped by other people. *Donatis* had to wait for the rector of Šibenik to help him.¹⁹

The most impressive story is the one of *Zvane Bužanić* from the island of Cres. Because of big

¹⁶ Gubernator of convict galleys Christophorus de Canali writes about it in his report to the Republic in 1549. (D. Klen, 1986, p. 185-196) Though he talks about convicts in the 16th century, the situation was pretty much the same even hundred years later with all galley-rowers.

¹⁷ For example, Pula had less than 2000 inhabitants and gave 50 galley-rowers.

¹⁸ D. Klen, 1986, p. 159-160.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 129.

cold on the galley, he had lost half of his foot and had been released. This 52 years old galley-slave could not walk without a stick. Nevertheless, in 1662 he was called to go rowing for another time. Therefore he asked the local authorities to call off their demand.²⁰

The last case closes the circle. If our hero was sent to galley again, everything could start from the very beginning once more. Fortunately, he stayed home on his island and continued to revive his old world. There were many sorrowful happenings, but at least one sad story has turned out to be a happy one.

Bibliography

1. Danilo Klen, *Ščavunska vesla*. IKS, Pula-Rijeka 1986.
2. Danilo Klen, *Galije i galijoti iz Istre i otoka nekadašnje sjeverne Dalmacije za mletačku armadu (XI-XVIII. st.)*. In: Rad JAZU 318, Zagreb 1959, p. 199-286.
3. Rudolf Strohal, *Zapisnici vrbničkog notara (bilježnika) iz godine 1644. i 1645.* In: Vjesnik Kr. hrvatsko-slavonsko-dalmatinskoga zemaljskoga arkiva, XII, Zagreb 1910, p. 147-162.
4. Nada Klaić, *Izvori za hrvatsku povijest do 1526. godine*. Zagreb 1972.

²⁰ The source is his asking addressed to the Venetian administrator of Cres. He writes in Italian Venetian dialect, probably learned on galley: "... et chussi io Zuane son qua a cosa solo la obediencia per obedire la Gustia et non scampo Š...Č Ma mi povero Zuane busanich coto con una Gamba che mancano mezo pije quello Go perso in Galera di Gran fredura come ancho testificarono li uilotti della nostra uilla Š...Č di piu sono di anni n°52 secondo teste sicura il nostro Gudce come anche testificarno tuta la Visto la miga desgratia che non posso caminar senza di un pezzo di legno adesso la prego et me buto alli genocci auanti la Vostra Signoria Illustrissima che mi facette secondo digo ue spera in tal come." Ibidem, p. 199-200.

HISTORY OF THE NAVAL AFFAIRS IN THE SLOVENIAN LITTORAL

We can divide the history of naval affairs in the Slovenian part of Istria into six different periods. First, until the last quarter of the 13th century, second until the first half of the 17th century, and third up to the end of the Venetian maritime monopoly. Fourth until the decay of the Habsburg Empire, fifth between the two world wars and the last, sixth, starts with the integration of the Slovenian littoral into the territory of Slovenia.

The economic growth that, from the beginning of the 10th century, led to the development of the towns on the Slovenian coast (Koper, Izola, Piran, Milje-Muggia, Trst-Trieste) as well as to the development of navigation. Despite the growing influence of the Republic of Venice navigation in those cities was developing partly independently. Evidences for that are numerous mercantile contracts between those towns and other Istrian and Dalmatian towns and cities (like Piran with Rovinj, Split, Dubrovnik etc.). The maritime activity did in that time also involve the whole West Adriatic coast from Venice to Taranto.

At the end of the 13th century, Izola and Piran have been forced to recognise the supremacy of Venice. Muggia did the same half a century later. Those cities remained under the Venetian hegemony until 1797. Trieste politically and economically belonged to the forces in the hinterland. Venetian domination over the Adriatic decisively influenced the development of navigation, the navy and the shipbuilding in that region.

The traffic between the inland and the ports at the highest points reached more than 200.000 freights.

The towns on the Slovenian coast intended to affirm themselves in maritime trade. All of them had ship building yards, and were building smaller ships. The trade business from the 14th century on was like in other Mediterranean cities.

Trieste, however, was in better position, for it wasn't under the Venetian control. At the end of the 15th century it got the support of the Habsburgs, and was trading with the Adriatic as well as some other cities, like Patras in Greece etc. The Maritime connections of the previously mentioned towns spread all over the Adriatic coast. From the second half of the 14 century we can follow mostly unsuccessful attempts of the Slovenian hinterland to become involved into the maritime trade.

With the Venetian loosing of power the relations between the *Serrnisima* and the Habsburgs were getting worse. In 1701 the emperor Leopold I, following his mercantile policy, forbade loading the foreign ships if local ones were available. In 1717 the emperor Charles VI declared free navigation in the Adriatic Sea. Two years later he declared Trieste and Rijeka to be free ports. The privileged position of Trieste, which was also chosen to the main Habsburg port, caused all the neighbour cities to remain small and unimportant. The power of Venice quickly descended. In the years 1753 - 1780 the traffic in Trieste arose from 22.500 to 80.000 tons. This represented one quarter of the Empire's international trade. The number

of inhabitants arose from 3865 in the year 1735 to about 28.000 by the end of the century. In spite of weakening of the Venetian monopoly other cities of the Slovenian coast haven't been able to improve their situation and the only trade that was growing was contraband trade. In the time when all the main routes from the hinterland moved to Trieste they lost the economic basis for every bigger activity in navigation and maritime trade and couldn't develop themselves into bigger centres of trade even after the decline of the Republic of Venice and political annexation to the hinterland. They closely connected themselves with Trieste and its market.

During the fourth period, when, after the collapse of the Venetian Republic both the hinterland and the coastal regions became part of one political entity, Trieste developed into one of the biggest ports and industrial centres of the Mediterranean. The only bigger stagnation in that period was the French (Napoleon) rule. In 1913 about 700.000 BRT of ships or 7/8 of all the Austrian merchant fleet and the traffic with the hinterland registered in Trieste reached 6.147.000 tons of goods.

The people of Slovenian and Croatian origin also played very big role in the development of Trieste into a large city. According to the official statistic in the year 1910 Trieste had 230.000 inhabitants. There were 80.000 people of the South Slavic origin, 56.916 Slovenes among them. Many businessmen and sailors from Istria and Dalmatia came to Trieste, especially after the crisis of the long-range sailingboats. Before the WWI people of Slovenian and Croatian origin owned 20% of all ships registered in Trieste (the Italians had only 19.08%). Slovenian and Croatian bank capital in Trieste made 50% of Italian bank capital. The destiny of other cities in that region was totally different. They remained unimportant local harbours without bigger industry. They lived in the shadow of Trieste that had incorporated Milje-Muggia and Tržič-Monfalcone. Their maritime activity was reduced to the small territory of Istria. Before the WWI Koper had only one shipping company with four steamers for the coastal navigation (770 BRT together).

After the disintegration of the Austria-Hungary Slovenian littoral with Trieste came under the Italian sovereignty. The conditions relevant to the development of navigation in the Slovenian coastal towns changed considerably. Trieste, separated from the biggest part of its natural hinterland, felt the consequences of becoming a part of the Kingdom of Italy. During that period it hasn't reached the traffic that it had at its highs in 1913. The tonnage of the ships registered in Trieste was in constant decline. Trieste lost its natural hinterland and no artificial measures of the Italian authorities were able to improve the conditions of the city's economy. Other towns on the Slovenian coast were also declining. The sea traffic hasn't reached more than 120.000 tons per year. The passenger traffic was the only exception.

After the WWII, or even more precisely, after the solving of the "Trieste question" in 1954 the very city of Trieste with its close hinterland belonged to Italy. The rest of the Slovenian littoral became a part of Tito's Yugoslavia. Trieste lost its significance in favour of other cities on the Slovenian coast, especially Koper. Izola overtook the shipbuilding and Piran was traditionally the seat of maritime enterprises and institutions.

EVENTS IN FINLAND AND ITS COAST DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR 1854-1855

Introduction

In my essay I am trying to describe briefly the impacts of the Crimean war, which was mainly fought on the Crimean peninsula, on Finland's Grand-Duchy. The war was not only fought on Crimean peninsula but the allied forces (which consisted of British and French troops) expanded the warfare to Finland's coast in 1854-1855. Main reason for the British and the French was not to threaten Finland but, naturally, to threaten St Petersburg and stop Russia's foreign trade.

Was it necessary to attack Finland's coastal towns and fortresses? How did the allied forces succeed in their attacks? Were the attacks approved by the Brits and the French back home to England and France? Were two fighting parties equal? Among other things my essay tries to answer these questions.

Finland Grand-Duchy Maritime Defensive Preparedness

After the Finland's War (1808-1809) in 1810 the Finnish army was broken up. Finland's defence was quite limited and sea fortresses which played an important role in Saint Petersburg's defence were lay to decay. anyhow where were some Finns who made a military career in Russia and also returned back home to serve their country. Very little money was spent on Finland's coastal fortresses. All the fortresses that were already built by Swedes (Hamina, Hanko, Svartholm, Viapory and Viipuri) formed the backbone of the sea defence. Viapori, the fortress in front of Helsinki was the most important and best equipped fortress but it was losing its power in the early 1800's. For example after the old Swedish cannons had fallen out of use no new ones were bought to replace them. The reason for Russian's indifference to Finland's coastal areas defence was caused by their belief that the Russian army could protect the Gulf of Finland's coast. The Russian navy and sea fortresses were not that important anymore.

Anyhow Nicholas I launched rebuilding of the navy in 1825 and the project lasted more than 30 years. The level of rebuilding was not that high, e.g. ships that were built the old-fashioned (Almost no steamships were built and most ships were vessels.) and couldn't compete with greater sea powers as England's.

In 1840's the weak state of Finland's coastal fortresses' was realised and even though fortresses condition started to improve especially in the south-western parts of Finland, the time ran out and

Crimean War expanded to the Finland's shore.

The First Summer of the War in Finland

On 27th March 1854 the British and French declared war to Russia and became involved in the Crimean War which started in 1853 as a conflict between Russia and Turkey. The reason why the allied forces got involved in the conflict was that Russia didn't pull its troops from the country of Donau like the allied forces demanded. At the time neither the Russian troops nor the ones of allied forces were in excellent shape.

Springtime privateer warfare and raising the defence preparedness

The allied forces became military interested in the Finland's coast and in the entire Gulf of Finland even before they declared war to Russia. Their goal was to stop Russia's foreign trade and prevent the supply of the important cargoes which was usually consisted of different food supplies and drinks.

The growing threat of the British started to worry the Finns. As mentioned earlier, after the Finish War (1808-1809) there was no a Finnish army, troops and compulsory military service for the Finns but then the old army was launched again. In the end of 1854 there were already six battalions each of which consisted of 600men and the battalions were placed around Grand-Duchy, in Mikkeli, Kuopio, Hämeenlinna, Turku, Vaasa and Oulu. Naturally fortresses preparedness was improved but not enough had been done when the first battle was to fought.

Summer battles

On the 19th May the British moved from privateer warfare to the real one when they attacked the town of Tammissaari. The attack wasn't successful as the British had expected and the Finns were able to defend their town for a day. Anyhow the British managed to get pretty close to the town and then ended the attack for a night. On the following day the Finns got more troops to help them but that wasn't enough to defend the town. The British attacks as going well when unluckily the second of the two British battle ships ran on the rocks and that drew both ships to escape back to the open sea. Tammissaari was saved and the British had never returned to the town.

After the events in Taamisaari the British attacked a few coastal towns, e.g. Kemijärvi, Oulu, Raahe, Kokkola and Hanko during May and June 1854. British Admiral Plumbridge who was mostly in

charge of these operations estimated that the damage had been worth of 300 000 pounds in Oulu and 60 000 pounds in Raahe. The destruction of Finnish towns caused some dissatisfaction in Britain. There was an article in Times in which the doings of British navy in the Baltic sea was criticised. article's writer saw no good reason for attacking the towns in which there were no Russian troops or establishments.

Bomarsund's battle: fortress's takeover and destruction

The allied forces decided to choose Bomarsund as the target for their next attack. Why should they attack Bomarsund? The allied forces calculated that there was no use even to try to attack the fortress of Kronstadt, Tallinn and Viapori or to get a battle going on with the Russian navy because nothing would happen. So, they chose Bomarsund - the fortress the building of which had started in 1830 and only the main building was ready by the year 1854, while everything else was under construction. Naturally Bomarsund was an easy target and also a useful one because the allied forces thought the attack would draw Sweden from neutrality into the war on the allied force's side. Bomarsund's takeover would make Sweden interested in reuniting at least Åland or maybe entire Finland to Sweden.

The first contact the Brits had with Bomarsund's fortress on 21st June when Captain William Hall led the attack. The attack was captain's own decision but later this reconnaissance in force was approved by the highest officials and by the people back home; the attack was seen as a sign proving that the navy was trying to do something noteworthy, to harm Russia and not the innocent civilians.

The battle lasted the entire day until late in the evening. Anyhow the Brits were the ones who suffered greater loss. One of the ships caught fire and the other suffered general loss when the soldiers were injured, some men were lost and the ships suffered some damage. The Brits decided to withdraw back to the sea and the weak fortress was this time a winner. Although the Brits suffered some loss, they got lots of information for the actual attack they were planning. They found out the fortress's weak points and knew that when it was the time for the next attack they just had to isolate the fortress from the mainland and bring the French landing troops with them.

From the late July the beginning of August the allied forces shipped the landing troops to Åland. At the same time the defenders of Bomarsund were repairing the damage the Brits had caused and in Saint Petersburg the Russians were planning to bring their navy to help Bomarsund defend Åland. Czar ordered ships from Helsinki and Turku to Åland to stop the enemy's access to Bomarsund front but when the ships got to Åland it was already too late and the enemy was in Bomarsund's waters.

Before the main battle started there was a couple of smaller attacks in the beginning of August. The actual attack started on 13th August when Bomarsund's bombing continued from both sea and land. The fortress was able to hold on until after midnight on 16th August when General Bodisko who was in charge of Bomarsund's defence decided to surrender and the white flag was hoisted. Everyone defending the fortress was taken by the Brits and the French as prisoner and shipped to England or France where they were released at the end of war.

After Bomarsund

Bomarsund's battle made the Russians afraid of possible invasion which the allied forces would try to do in the South-Western Finland. British Admiral Napier was planning to attack Turku after Bomarsund but didn't get French support for the attack and the idea was forgotten. There was a small battle in Turku's front in late August which didn't cause much harm on either side. After Turku's incident warfare slowed down and by the end of October almost all the Brits and the French had left the Baltic Sea for the winter. The last ships left the Gulf of Finland for England in the beginning of December.

Sweden didn't take its chance to reunite Finland or at last Åland. Sweden's decision disappointed also some Finns. The French were content with their navy's work in the North but British Admiral Napier was released from his duties back in England. During the winter Finland's maritime defence's level started to improve. The supervisor for the job was General-governor Menshikov's deputy von Berg. There was no general opinion of the war in Finland during and after the first summer of the war. The Finns thought that the Russians were responsible for the war and that they themselves didn't have to do anything with the whole conflict. The first summer of war awoke patriotism in some people.

The Second Summer of War

Before the battles of 1855 the sea defence had been improved especially in front of Helsinki, in its fortress Viapori and the town itself. The allied forces had improved their navy and that summer it consisted of 70 English and 20 French ships. The allied forces' headquarters was no longer Gotland like the last year but in Naissaari near to Tallin. One could see from changing the position of the headquarters also a change in where the allied forces were planning to concentrate their action, i.e. to the Southern and the South-Eastern parts of the Gulf of Finland. Rear-admiral Dundas was named to replace Admiral Napier. No generals were sent to the Baltic Sea that summer and all in all it seemed that the allied forces weren't risking the Baltic Sea as they did last summer. However, there had been plans not just to bomb but also to temporarily invade Kronstadt's and Viapori's fortresses. These plans were later forgotten.

The allied forces started their second summer in the North as they did start their first one, by inquiring into the fortresses' condition and by training the navy. In May Admiral Dundas announced that he had been given an order that all the coasters the allied forces might come across in the area of the Baltic Sea which were known for sure to be Russian property and which weren't valuable enough for the capturer to take over were to be destroyed. This order didn't include ships that were anchored empty and which weren't used as trade ships. British soldiers started sabotages in the end of May by burning a couple of ships in Hankoniemi and stealing a couple of others.

Actions in the Gulf of Bothnia

In the Gulf of Bothnia the allied forces' actions were, sadly enough, similar to the last years' actions. Many coastal towns had to suffer of robbing, bombing and destroying of many material stores. The actions can't be approved because a major part of destroyed or steeled property was civilians' and not Russian throne's. Many times civilians had to defend their town alone without any help from the army but luckily many times they also succeeded in saving their towns from total disaster. Sabotages continued the entire summer until November but the trade embargo that the allied forces were looking after didn't succeed perfectly. Finnish and Russian trade ships managed to import necessary raw materials from Sweden until the winter.

Viapori bombing

The actions of the allied forces were mainly small sabotages for great part of the summer 1855. There was no real military battle fought but the allied forces attacked towns in the North as mentioned and the Southern coastal towns of the Gulf of Finland. Reason for the attacks was the same as in the North: maintaining of the embargo. Of course a big military battle was needed and especially the Brits back home required it. After series of reconnaissance of Kronstadt's condition and its defence's preparedness the allied forces decided that Kronstadt was too strong a fortress and that there was no use of trying to attack it. Viapori, the second strongest fortress, was chosen to be the target of that summer's big attack.

As mentioned earlier especially Viapori's defence preparedness was improved after the summer of 1854. In the fortress the soldiers were mainly Russian but in the mainland around Helsinki the defence was Finnish. During the spring and summer 12 kilometres long defence line was created which started from Lauttasaari and reached Viapori via Jätkäsaari, Hietalathi, Punavuori, Harakka and Kaivopuisto. The fortress area continued then eastward towards Vallisaari, Kuningassaari, Santahamina and Laajasalo.

The first battle was on 22nd June in the eastern part of the defence line. The attack was meant to be just a regular reconnaissance in force and it lasted about three hours. The allied forces left the shore after getting enough information.

In the beginning of August it was reported that the allied forces' navy in front of Naissaari consisted of 85 ships. The first part of the navy which consisted of British ships took off on 6th August and French ships followed it later that evening. On 7th August the allied forces' ships could be seen in front of Helsinki. For the next couple of days the allied forces just planned their ships' position and chose the action stations outside the main area which they were well aware of. In the morning of the 9th August the bombing started and it caused fires and explosions in the fortress. In the afternoon the enemy also started shooting Lauttasaari and the shooting didn't stop even for the night. The battle continued until the morning of 13th and the entire navy had left Helsinki on 14th. Viapori was able to hold on for eight days of threat and 46 hours of continual bombing and it is surprising the damage in men and material wasn't as

bad as one might expect.

But the allied forces weren't either that disappointed even though they weren't able to destroy the fortress entirely. Admiral Dundas actually reported that the operation had gone pretty well and that especially the French earned distinction.

Later in autumn the allied force's navy returned to the old routine which was burning towns and causing other kinds of harm to civilians and not so many military operations. Only in Tulliniemi, in Hanko, 400 British invaded in late September. There was an armed conflict, but only one telegraph wire was destroyed. In November all of the allied forces had left the Baltic Sea and didn't return the following summer, as the peace was made in March 1856.

Conclusion

When did the allied forces expand the warfare to the North? It was well-known fact to the allied forces as well that they weren't at their strongest when it comes to the state of the army. Why scatter the army on two fronts? Of course it is very obvious. By threatening Russia's capital Saint Petersburg the allied forces forced the Russians scatter their army on two fronts, the one in the North seeming to be more important. even though there were no big battles fought in the North the constant threat of the allied forces stressed the Russians. The presence of the allied forces drew the Russians to bring more and more troops to the North and the meant better chance for the allied forces to get hold of the battle in the Balkans. As British economic historian Basil Greenhill has said, the battles in the North may have better proved Russian military weakness than the ones in the South.

Was it then necessary to attack Finland's coastal towns? Not really, at least in the way which allied forces did it. The trade embargo they were looking after could have been handled in different way. Maybe the attacks were necessary to keep the threat of the allied forces real for the Russians and the Finns. The attacks on the towns weren't equal but the "real" attacks against on the fortresses were a bit more equal.

I found the separation of the Russians and the Finns in the minds of the Brits the most interesting part in the literature I have read. Not even 50 years before the Crimean War had Finland been a country of Sweden and not many separated the Finns and Swedes at that time. During the Crimean War it was written in The Times how unfair it is for the Finns to suffer of attacks that were supposed to harm Russia and the Russians. Even then the Finns didn't seem to be alone in their belief of being their own nation.

Bibliography

Mattila, Tapani-Vitikka, Olavi: *Uhka Lännessä*. Jyväskylä 1996

Meri, Veijo: *Huonot tiet, hyvät hevoet*. Keuruu 1994.

Schulman, Hugo: *Tapahtumia Suomessa Krimin sodan aikaan 1854-1855*. Helsinki 1905.

Francisco Panteghini, *ISHA Venice*

SEA POWER : A GOOD INVESTMENT?*

1 - Sea Power: a definition

This paper is centered around the research of today's meaning, importance and advantage for a state (or Federation) to build up and to maintain a Sea Power.

Who is this unknown? A first definition sounds like this: it's the capacity of control, use, navigation of a sea surface (and depths) more or less wide and the capacity to forbid that others can do the same. Another definition, given by an Italian naval scholar is: "Sea Power is the capacity to state, on and beyond the seas, sovereignty, warranty and guardianship of his political, strategic and economic interests wherever they are placed". The forming of Sea Power aims you a complete Sea Dominion - Italian "Dominio del Mare" - that, in peace time, allows to navigate seas - the cheaper trading routes - to exploit natural resources like gas or petrol deposit, to fish, to control and secure sea traffic and to limit immigration and contraband across the sea; in war time, Sea Dominion warrants naval transports (imports, exports, troop transport) and denies that enemy forces do the same, destroying his ships or holding them in port, strangling his economy and menacing the security of his coasts (bombardment, landing troupes or infiltration of spy and sappers).

Today Sea Power is valued on global terms (that is the ability of Power, of a State to show its Sea Power in all the seas of the world): this is because Countries and seas of "national economic interest" are grown so far and because modern weapons, technology and communications have reduced drastically even the wider oceans to accessible seas.

Today the only State (Federation) that can manifest its Sea Power all around the legendary Seven Seas are the United States of America. In spite of funds cut of Us Navy at the end of Cold War, the American Navy, with its four hundreds and more battleships (including the greatest battleships of human history: nuclear-powered aircraft-carriers), supported by friendly nations and military bases in all the world, represent an unattainable model to the others Maritime Powers. It's American an important school of naval thinkers, started by the renowned historian (and naval officer) Alfred Mahan (dead in 1914, he wrote the important book "The influence of Sea Power on history, 1660 - 1783").

From American admiral William Chester Nimitz comes one of most famous and used analysis of Sea Power. Written with the collaboration of professor Potter, in the fifties, but today present, this work examines the constitutive elements and the steps to undertake, to build up and maintain an true Sea Power.

Constitutive elements of Sea Power are:

1. geographic position (borders to defend, territory shape, collocation and vulnerability of strategic points

* The following text was not proof-read.

like major cities, industries, military bases etc.), extent (space is resource: it allows to space out potential objectives, demands more or less time and resources to an invader to be occupied), extent and shape of coasts (more or less capacity to control and to defend them, access to the sea, control on maritime routes), internal communication lines (to value vulnerability to bombardment and naval blockade), number and quality of ports (they define number and size of the ships to build and use);

2. population (how many inhabitants, potentially how many soldiers and seamen) and nature of people (public spirit, patriotism, popularity of Armed Forces, seafaring tradition);
3. quality and nature of government (democracy; skill, popularity and far-sight of ruling classes, care to economic strategic sectors and defense, efficient bureaucracy), international alignment (alliances, military support near and far from mainland, ability of diplomatic service, international roll and prestige);
4. economic power (wealth, industrialization, scientific research and development of new technologies, energy sources, fiscal income, citizens' welfare, degree of dependence from foreign countries), developed industrial system (heavy industries, steel-plant, refineries, shipyards, armament industry, fuel and materials supply);
5. maritime trade (tonnage and control of merchant navy, degree of exploitation, use, dependence and vulnerability on seas, trading routes and direct contents and influence on Countries overseas, supporting troops for the Navy);
6. warship (number, quality and functions they can carry out), arming (missiles, aircraft etc.) and military technology, personnel (quantity, motivation, training, good officers), infrastructures (bases, training points, arsenals), financial and human resources.

This analysis shows all the factors that, in different ways and with different force, contributes to build and to shape a Sea Power. The first purpose is to dominate the seas, even if for limited time and, of course, well defined spaces, so that economic and strategic interests of the Power are warranted.

Naval tacticians have classified the functions a Sea Power can exert, so to clarify objectives and means to obtain these ones. These functions are:

- 1) Sea Denial: the Power can deny to all from navigating the seas under its influence, it can attack and destroy ships with submarines, torpedo-boats, floating mines, land based missiles and airplanes.
- 2) sea Control: the power can warrant its merchant and military ships to navigate, with safety, seas under control, it can hold and check all ships in the area and defend at wide range its coasts. This function needs more diversified ships and resources than Sea Denial: efficient Coast guard and technology to control and direct maritime traffic, aerial patrol at wide range, warships of good tonnage and offensive power, equipped with anti-submarine arming, helicopters and medium range missiles like frigates and corvettes (ships of 2000-3000 tons and crew of 200-300 men), minesweepers.
- 3) power Projection. the power can project its military force overseas and its warships can attack enemy territory and routes of interest far from its own bases of operations, support a landing of troops or sippers. Such function needs powerful warships (great autonomy, powerful arming such as long range missiles),

escort, supply and machine-shop ships, troops transports, adequate air support.

2- Naval Power

What is Naval Power instead ? It's not the same of Sea Power, Naval Power is a part of this, it values number, efficiency, arming of ships and bases of Navy, comparing with potentials opposing navy to simulate its chances of victories and graduating his strength in a world classing, it's similar to the concept of Air or Land power. In the analysis above Naval Power is the same that the sixth point of Nimitz analysis.

sea power instead isn't it a strictly military concept: includes geographic, political, economic, technological, social and military factors. Another important difference is that Naval Power can be built up easily by buying warships, know-how, strangers trainers and so on (as Argentina did for example), but Sea power can only be obtained in many years, maybe an entire historic period by navigating, trading, and fighting on sea: so a Country develops and brings out the basic factors (as showed above) of a durable Sea Power.

A telling imagine shows that Naval Power and Sea Power have the same rapport that the iron point and the staff of the lance. What does it mean? Naval power is the point in crisis and war situations, hits and damages the enemy but to do this he needs a contribution of many non-military factors that allow to throw the spear, to mobilize troops and move fast, to have supply, to fight in better conditions: in short to the elements shown in Nimitz analysis.

Any state that wants to project itself on seas has to take care to many things, but to change history and tradition to want is not enough. the greatest modern case of building of Sea power is Soviet Union after World War II: grew up like a Superpower during the war, Russia understand clearly that to project its influence (no more the revolutionary winds but the need of allies in Cold War) it needed to have a Navy and it build up industries, developed nuclear propulsion, encouraged oceanographic researches, trained seamen, built seaports, naval bases, a merchant and a fishing fleet and perhaps the second navy of the world.

an enormous effort that cannot change reality of Russian economic backwardness (in front of USA) and its geographical position: closed seas at West (with Denmark and Turkey holding the keys and allied with the USA), the Arctic and Atlantic oceans north and East, three separate scenarios, it will be necessary to build up three Navy to contrast the greatest Sea Power allied against Russia. So the cleverest strategies understood that the real object attainable was a Sea Denial in those seas and the building of many nuclear deterrent.

3 - Sea Strategy

Sea Power contributes to form the Military power of a nation, that is the capacity to defend its territory

and independence and to beat an opposing army. But Sea Power can resume itself the Military Power when a war, with a Power Projection is fought far from its own national territory. In the Gulf War of 1991 the most of troops come by aircraft but 90% of supply, arming and vehicles came by sea. Besides, the role of navy in bombing enemy objectives, supporting land operations, bringing the air power of American aircraft-carriers and carrying into effect the sanctions versus Iraq with a blockade was of primary importance to win.

Sea strategy is very different from the land one: in open seas the word "defensive strategy" doesn't exist. A Navy can only attack enemy ships and coast, it can't wait in strength position to defend better. Warships hold in port are useless and became easier to hit since Naval Power became Air-Sea Power. The air attacks of Taranto and Pearl Harbor are the greater demonstration of it in World War II. Such an attack can destroy a Naval Power in few minutes without any naval beetle. A fleet must navigate, attacking opponent's sea-routes and ports, holding its lines of supply and menacing enemy coast, sinking war and merchant ships fight will grow up his superiority during the war up to reach a more or less total Sea dominion, destroying opposing Navy or holding enemy ships in port. This principle is true today only if an adequate air power it's owned by the major Sea Power. The last basic principal of Sea strategy is bases weakness, even if is unthinkable a Pearl Harbor today, but it confirms the importance of geographical position. Seaports and arsenals bring essentials logistic links with fleets, in spite of supply at sea and of the huge autonomy of naval units (something like navigating without need of stops of 3 months or so, with a fuel reserve that allows a world tour at medium cruising speed, not to say the autonomy of nuclear-powered ships).

I found in many articles a lot of Italian Officers, but I think all around the world, can be in the American Naval College too, preoccupation about the impact of new technologies, developed faster and faster, in sea strategy. They lament a lack of studies and, overall, a lack of experience in this years without great naval history and its teachings.

A late naval fight studied is the Falkland (Malvinas in Spanish) war of summer 1982. The British Navy sighted to a Sea Domain: holding in port Argentine war ships with its nuclear and conventional submarines, fighting the land based airplanes with planes embarked on two "pocket" aircraft-carriers, carrying troops and supporting the landing. So Great Britain showed what means the principle of Power Projection, retaking in few weeks Falkland Islands: 15000 kilometers far in south hemisphere.

4 - The Military Point of View...

When I started working at this paper I was skeptical on role of Sea Power: I lacked of a clear definition and I considered a dangerous and expensive mean of power, unbroken menace to peace. Going on, reading the "Rivista Marittima", official review of Italian Navy, and talking with my uncle, Navy officer in Ancona, I began to look the world through the military point of view, a pragmatic one.

Soldiers have no illusion about on world peace or human brotherhood, they look around them, weighting the others military forces, taking care of crisis situation, trying to forecast every danger for their nation, remembering the past lessons to be not mixed in future. The most military men don't seek fights and wars but they know that some smile or word of politicians and also the International Right, so weak today, can't stop an arming policy, unbroken provocations or an enemy invasion. They know clearly that the relations between states are based upon forces ratio, this continuous confrontation can change in intensity through economic treaties, raise or lowering of excises, diplomatic relations and pressures, opposing in thousand ways the adversary interests in an escalation that, if not held by a superior power or by practical conditions, can come to a military crisis or to an open war, even without they want it.

5 - ...and the Politic one.

States and governments that choose to accept International Right to regulate their conflicts cannot lack of an adequate military force to ask and obtain with credibility the ruling application. Military force is a fundamental qualification for a State to exist, it guards independence and sovereignty, without it, depending in only foreign aid, it will have a short life and its independence will be illusion.

Every State rich and politically developed that wants to act a prestigious role in the international scene must have a good military organization to defend his own territory and to take action out of that. For example in defense of national interest or in peacekeeping actions under United Nations flag.

Here comes the great importance of Sea Power: it allows to make interventions all around the World or so without any aid, because a powerful naval force need no land bases but acts as base of operation itself, safeguarding so a true autonomy of decision and action. Moreover, in spite of airplanes and missiles became fundamental weapons, alone they can't grant continuity and flexibility to accomplish objectives different from distorting at distance.

I hope that in few years a true supranational (I would say universal) power will grow displacing military point of view and granting the rule of an International law, holding wars. But now we are so far from that, and I agree with professional soldiers that combat against financial cuts and against too easy optimism of public opinion and, sometimes, of politicians themselves based as much on true hopes as on misinformation.

6 - Italy and Sea Power

I'm Italian and so I can't escape to get a look at today's role of Italy on seas. Looking far in past eras it's impossible not to be charmed by myth and reality of Roman Mare Nostrum. They reached an unequalled dominion of Mediterranean Sea because of Rome's Sea Power but especially because Romans managed to rule over all Mediterranean coasts and isles destroying every naval opponent and preventing any future growth of enemy Sea Power.

Italian maritime tradition boats the epos of Maritime republics (Venice and Genoa above all, what will

be happened to Crusaders without sea transport and supply in hostile lands?) and an epopee of great navigators and explorers in service to foreign kings (Columbus in Spain, the Cabotos in England).

Going on we can't forget, after the birth of Italian Kingdom in 1860, the building up of a powerful Navy that holds Absurbic fleet in port here in Pola for almost all World War I and dominate the Otranto's Channel.

After that Fascist Italy, dreaming a new Empire wasted a lot of money trying to rise the greatest Mediterranean Navy, but World War II fought against the greatest Sea Powers of the time (Great Britain and USA after 1941) destroyed inevitably this foolish dream. Foolish because of Italy's industrial and economic weakness, with a little merchant fleet, great vulnerability by sea, low resources and supply of fuel and steel.

The end of the war started a difficult history for Italian Navy: a hard peace treaty reduced it to a handful of old ships, no submarines and no assault ships, with total tonnage of 67000 tons and a staff of 25000 men. Only in 1951 the treaty clauses were considered decayed, owing to the entry, among the founding members, of Italy in the North Atlantic treaty Organization and the subsequent necessity to accomplish its obligations towards the Alliance.

At this point Italian rearmament had to face others difficulties: funds scarcity, hesitation of government and, what's more, the presence of American Sixth Fleet (headquarters situated in Naples) that relegated the Italian Navy to a second rank role. From 1974 to 1984 a Naval Law allowed, with extraordinary funds, the renew and develop naval units, breaking prohibition for the Navy to have aircrafts (important means in Anti Submarine hunt, sea patrol and attack).

In 1979 began the participation to peacekeeping mission organized by the United nations: Italy send troops overall ships to Lebanon, to the Red Sea and to Persian Gulf during the Iraq - Iran war to make sure navigation liberty. Italian Navy took part to the blockade to come true the embargo decreed by the Security Cancel against Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and at last with the participation in Gulf War in February 1991. The follows the Maritime Monitor mission in Adriatic and the support of Italian contingent in Somalia. Today the flux of illegal immigration from Albania is awaking a constant worry.

Now a speedy look of Italian Navy and strategic situation. At present Italian Navy is constituted by 40 or so great units (with 2 major cruisers, 4 destroyers, 13 frigates, 8 corvettes and 10 submarines) supported by a fifteen mineweepers, various suppliers and patrol units. Coastal Guard depends on the Navy too.

The position of Italian peninsula, outstretched into the Central Mediterranean Sea, the large extensions of its coasts and the control over many islands make vital the control of surroundings seas to secure national territory.

All the Italian strategists agree to the objects of Italian Sea Power: complete Sea Control in Adriatic, Ionic and Thyrrenian basins and in Channels of Sicily and Sardinia. An action of Sea Control or at least Sea Denial in Central Mediterranean and an ability to participate in Power Projections operations together with allied navies. This last point is a very questioned one because admit clearly a limit to independent action, first step to limit national sovereignty. But, considering carefully, even the others objects need collaboration by allies.

the reaching of these goals should allow to secure the country but, today, it's impossible that Italy alone has resources enough to build up a Navy so strong to do it, it will be very difficult even to a richer country. Italian national balance and public debt forbid such hypothesis, leaving only one solution: military integration. Collaboration treaty in weapons research, development and shipbuilding are already began.

7- International Scenario

Today in the world the greatest attempt to security are sudden crisis (civil wars, terrorism, illegal immigration, unlawful traffics) that request fast intervention: only the forces suddenly ready count and so the hard question of military men is if an Alliance can grant such rapidity and determination or will fall in continuous internal discussions?

Last year experience brings hard teachings about this. Militaries' fear is that politicians take the integration way because, financially, is the only one possible, hazarding national security without sureties. UEO, NATO, OSCE, UN haven't reached a convincing efficacy. UEO (European branch of NATO) and OSCE (European Conference for Security and Cooperation) are looked like possible means of a military integration of Europe in the retreat of USA. Looking the very next future many Navy officers ask themselves if Italy, fifth or sixth industrial power, will be equal to the task to be the only Sea Power turned completely towards the Mediterranean at the moment of an hypothetical withdrawal of the imposing American arrayment (the Sixth Fleet, military and arial bases).

The title of only Naval Power really Mediterranean arises from the consideration that the French Navy (perhaps the fourth in the world, and equipped with nuclear submarines and weapons) and the Spanish one are employed in the Atlantic Ocean too, and the others Mediterranean Navies are a step below (Greece holds one of the biggest Merchant fleets of the World but its Navy is inferior in quantity and quality it Italian one).

In this future, yet started, the scenery that looms as the most probable and dangerous is the one of the mounting crisis between the richest countries and the poorest one, between North and South of the World manifesting not with an open war, but with the feared mass migrations of millions of people that risk to bring the coast in many Countries. One of the borders from North and South of the world cuts the Mediterranean and from such consideration come the importance of Sea Domain of that area: so to deny mass landing of illegal immigrant - hard to control - holding them at sea and checking boats to prevent smuggling of drugs and weapons.

This is selfish thinking but, in situation like Albanians' landing on Italian shores - managed by the criminal underworld and probably the first worrying signals of a growing phenomenon - Governments can't abdicate their power to control immigration and chaotic situation even by using force, because they have to safeguard their citizens and their capacity of discussing and trying to resolve the crisis with their means (diplomatic confrontation, economic aid, development projects, controlled immigration and so on). revolution isn't one of these means!

THE GULF OF FINLAND'S OUTER ISLANDS IN NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE FINNISH-RUSSIAN WAR

Preface

The question of the Gulf of Finland's outer islands played a significant role in negotiations preceding the Winter War. These negotiations took place in 1938-39. At that time the political situation in Europe was becoming more severe and Stalin feared that Hitler's Germany might attack the Soviet Union. In the negotiations the Soviet Union demanded, among other demands for territory like parts of Eastern Karelia, to get control over the Gulf of Finland's outer islands in order to secure the sea route leading to Leningrad. However, the Finnish government refused to yield its eastern neighbor's demands and war broke out between the parties when the Soviet Union assaulted Finland at the end of November 1939. The aggressor conquered the islands without any resistance. Peace treaty was concluded in Moscow in April 1940 and the islands were left in the Soviet Union's possession.

In this paper my aim is to perceive the outer islands' role in negotiations and create a general idea of negotiations as a whole. In addition, I will draw attention to the strategic meaning of the islands as well as give an account of Finnish politicians' views towards the Soviet Union's demands. I shall also make a summary of Europe's tightening political situation just before the war.

There is not much to tell about the battles on the islands because Finland had no adequate resources to defend the islands. Therefore, the Red Army had almost free hands to take the islands into their possession.

The islands consist of Suursaari, Tytärsaari, Lavansaari, Peninsaari and Seiskari. Suursaari was the most important of the islands, or at least in the minds of Stalin and Molotov. On one hand, it was the only one that had a permanent settlement, on the other, it was distinctly biggest and thus a perfect location for Soviet artillery to segregate the Gulf of Finland's eastern part from unwanted intruders.

2. From Jartsev to Negotiations in Moscow

As already mentioned, the outer islands had very considerable strategic meaning for Leningrad's safety. The owner of the islands could observe the marine traffic of the eastern part of the Gulf. Although Suursaari was demilitarized in 1920 under Tartu's peace pact, it was not enough for the Soviet Union's leaders who feared the attack from Hitler's strengthened Germany. In these circumstances *generalissimos* Stalin took measures in a matter concerning the security of Leningrad, which at that time had 3,5 million inhabitants.

In the spring of 1938 Boris Jartsev, who worked as a second class legation officer in the Soviet

Union's embassy in Helsinki, contacted Finland's minister of foreign affairs, Rudolf Holsti. He said that he wanted to "discuss actual political issues". The situation in the Soviet Union was tense then; Austria had been incorporated into Germany only a month ago and it seemed that Czechoslovakia would be next. Stalin feared that the Soviet Union might fall in a difficult situation because of the pact of mutual assistance which was concluded between France, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. According to Jartsev, Germany had intentions to start a war against the Soviet Union and Hitler would probably use Finland's territory in his hostile plans. Jartsev offered Red Army's help to repel the attack. He also wanted Holsti promise that Finland would not assist the aggressor. One of Jartsev's proposals was that Suursaari be fortified by Soviet troops in order to defend Leningrad.

Holsti told Jartsev that Finland was a neutral country and she would, if necessary, defend her territorial integrity with all efforts. President Kallio and the Prime Minister Cajander were as less interested in Jartsev's suggestions than Holsti. Jartsev was told, in Cajander's view, that "the proposal concerning Suursaari was in clash with Finland's policy of neutrality and it also offended Finland's sovereignty" (Kallenautio 1985, p. 177).

It is possible that Finnish politicians didn't really know who they were dealing with; they were treating Jartsev as they would treat any second-class legation officer. Finnish politicians didn't know that Jartsev was sent by Stalin himself to discuss the issues concerning Leningrad's security.

Jartsev's proposals were thus neglected by the Finnish government but the Soviet Union was persistent. The Union's deputy Foreign Secretary, Litvinov, in the spring of 1939 announced that the Soviet Union wanted to rent the Gulf of Finland's outer islands for 30 years. In return he offered the areas from Eastern Karelia. The Finnish government replied to Litvinov in a similar tone it had replied to Jartsev: Finland does not trade with her areas. Marshall Mannerheim, the head of the army and future president, was left in opposition because of his opinions. He thought that Finland had no use of those islands. Litvinov was not content with the government's reply and therefore sent former ambassador of Finland, Boris Stein, to negotiate with Eljas Erkko, who had replaced Holsti as a Foreign Secretary in November 1938. As shown later, Erkko objected the Soviet Union's demands most intensely. His curt answer to Stein was that "Finland does not discuss about her territories" (Merri 1996, p. 268). Stein left Helsinki empty-headed.

3. Autumn in Moscow

At the beginning of September 1939 Molotov expressed his wish to begin a conversation with the Finnish government about important political issue. Situation had altered radically since the previous spring: Ribbentrop and Molotov had concluded a non-aggression pact on August 23, just five weeks earlier. Interests of both countries concerning the pact were strategic and selfish only. The pact was a perfect example of cold practical politics which had nothing to do with disagreements on ideological questions that existed between two countries. Hitler wanted to avoid war on two fronts; he wanted to attack the western front first and do it with his back leaned on Moscow. For the Soviet Union the pact

meant that it was no longer isolated from the capital world. She began to arrange Eastern Europe's borders in accordance with her own interests (Paasikivi 1979, pp. 32-33, Kallenautio 1985, pp. 179-180). Both Stalin and Hitler knew, of course, that war between their countries could not be avoided for long. Both parties bought the time with the pact: Hitler to invade Western Europe and Stalin to get his armament industry started.

There was certain uncertainty in Finland when the news about the pact were released. When an invitation to negotiate arrived from Moscow, the situation cleared out. The Baltic states had received invitations from Moscow couple of weeks earlier. Erkkö refused to travel to Moscow and therefore the government asked J.K. Paasikivi, an old statesman who at that time worked as Finland's ambassador in Stockholm, whether he was willing to go. Paasikivi agreed, being aware of how difficult the situation for Finland was. Erkkö instructed Paasikivi how to deal with Molotov's demands: first, Paasikivi was not in the position to make any decisions for the, for decisions must have been left to the parliament and the government. Second, Paasikivi was to turn down any Molotov's offer suggesting some kind of treaty of mutual assistance. Third, he was not allowed to discuss about ceding Finland's territories to the Soviet Union and fourth, as an "extreme concession", he could discuss about all the Gulf of Finland's outer islands except Suursaari.

Paasikivi visited Moscow three times that autumn. He returned to Helsinki between the negotiations to discuss Stalin's and Molotov's demands with the Finnish government. When Paasikivi went to Moscow for the second time, he took along his old friend Väinö Tanner who was then chairman of Finland's Social Democratic Party and also Secretary of the Treasury. At the beginning of negotiations with Stalin and Molotov the Gulf of Finland's outer islands were the main topic, but later the islands were disregarded when more disputed issues appeared.

Paasikivi met Molotov and Stalin for the first time on 12 September. Stalin was present at all the meetings except one. This fact proves the importance of these negotiations to the Soviets. Before Finland's turn came, Stalin and Molotov had already concluded the pacts of mutual assistance with all three Baltic states. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also agreed that the Soviet Union could establish military bases on their territories.

Just as the Finnish government had feared, Stalin's first suggestion to Paasikivi was concluding a mutual military assistance pact. Paasikivi replied that it would wreck Finland's neutrality. Stalin then offered co-operation between Finland and the Soviet Union in order to defend the Gulf of Finland from hostile troops, no matter which country was attacking. At that time Stalin also feared the hostilities of British troops. Paasikivi objected this proposition as well. He said that Stalin's offer was not in harmony with Finland's policy of neutrality. Surprisingly Stalin gave up on these two demands but he was, unfortunate for Finland, even more unshakable when it came to his other demands. Stalin informed harshly that he wanted the Gulf of Finland's outer islands, including Suursaari. He wanted to secure the naval route that led to Leningrad because he wished to avoid events of 1919 happening again. In 1919 General Judentsin attacked Leningrad via the Gulf of Finland. In the same year Kronstadt's navy base was attacked by British cruisers and torpedo boats which used the same route as Judentsin.

Stalin and Molotov were not satisfied with the islands. They also wanted rectification of the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus. The Karelian Isthmus was a narrow strip of Finland the border line of which was located only 32 kilometers from Leningrad. The demands also included the leasehold of Hanko Peninsula for 30 years and ceding the parts of Petsamo from the coast of the Arctic Ocean. In return they offered large but worthless and uninhabited areas of Eastern Karelia.

Stalin's view was that rectification of the frontier of the Karelian Isthmus was absolutely necessary because the distance from the border to Leningrad was too short; Stalin wanted it to be at least 70 kilometers. The Hanko Peninsula was on Stalin's list because he wanted to control the traffic on the Gulf of Finland and isolate eastern part of the Gulf from outsiders. The peninsula was needed, above all, for heavy artillery. The Soviets already had Paltiskis' military base on the opposite side of the Gulf. With bases on opposite sides they could effectively repel attacks.

In general, this is what the Soviet Union demanded of her small neighbor. Paasikivi and his partner Tanner discussed these terms tensely both in Helsinki with Finland's government and in Moscow. The most heated arm wrestling probably took place in Helsinki. Erkkö objected almost everything Stalin demanded. He was willing, however, to let go of the outer islands but he didn't want to give up of Suursaari.

The question concerning the islands wasn't as controversial as the question concerning the Karelian Isthmus or the Hanko Peninsula: the parties could have reached a mutual understanding of that issue. Suursaari was, however, still an object of disputes. The Finland's government agreed to cede the island's southern part but Stalin was not content with it. The government was also willing to give up the Karelian Isthmus but not in the proportions that Stalin demanded. Stalin was later willing to compromise on his conditions but an agreement was not reached.

The Hanko Peninsula set an insurmountable barrier for an agreement. Erkkö rigidly objected to ceding of the Peninsula. Paasikivi also had his doubts about the issue. Paasikivi and Mannerheim wanted to offer the island Jussarö off Hanko shore. Erkkö opposed this proposition and said that the Finnish People would never accept it. At the last negotiations in Moscow at the beginning of November Stalin wanted to make a concession and was willing to satisfy with three small islands located on the eastern coast of the Hanko Peninsula. Paasikivi and Tanner knew that a mutual understanding could not be reached if the question concerning the Hanko Peninsula was left unsolved. Paasikivi sent a telegram to Helsinki asking if he could offer Stalin the island of Jussarö or the three islands Stalin had already talked about. The answer from Helsinki was harsh: Paasikivi was not allowed to mention Jussarö or the three small islands. The negotiations were finally over on 9 November when both parties agreed that an agreement could not be reached.

4. DISSENTING OPINIONS

The representatives of the government agreed mostly on the question concerning the outer islands but there were still dissimilar opinions. Paasikivi's point of view was that the islands were unnecessary for

Finland. Suursaari was the only island which had a permanent settlement, at that time around 500 inhabitants. Suursaari had developed as a popular tourist attraction in the late 1930's. Paasikivi was more reserved when it came to rectification of the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus and the Hanko Peninsula. As the autumn of 1939 progressed Paasikivi became even more convinced that Finland should satisfy the Soviet Union's needs in one way or another. He thought that an agreement was more advantageous for Finland than a war which then threatened her. Mannerheim and Tanner also agreed with Paasikivi.

Paasikivi's opinions can be easily understood if we examine the background of his political career. Since the turn of the century, when Finland was still under Russia's reign, Paasikivi had been an active person in the Finnish politics. He had always been a member of the Conservative Party and a representative of the so called "concession policy". At the beginning of the century, during the years of oppression, the czar enacted new strict laws that offended Finland's autonomy. Paasikivi's and his party's view was that Finland should just accept her destiny and assent to new laws. He had always thought that one should adopt a moderate attitude toward Russia, no matter whether the Russia in question was governed by czar or a bolshevist.

If Mannerheim, Tanner and Paasikivi were in favor of giving in to Stalin's demands, Erkko and War Secretary Juho Niukkanen were against it. The prime minister Cajander's opinion was that Finland could yield in the question concerning the outer islands but would stick to the Hanko Peninsula and the Karelian Isthmus. Mannerheim was afraid that Stalin would attack Finland and Mannerheim knew that Finland's army would not bear more than a couple of weeks under the Red Army's supremacy. Niukkanen, on the other hand, thought that Finland's army was well equipped and would be able to fight against Soviet troops for at least six months. The problem for Paasikivi and Mannerheim was that they were in no position to make any decision. The government, especially Erkko, made sure that no one messed around in their territory.

Erkko persuaded other members of the government to agree with views. He thought that Stalin was only bluffing and that he would eventually recede from his demand concerning the Hanko Peninsula. Erkko listened to various foreign observers, e.g. British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, whose opinion was that the Soviet Union would not start war against Finland. Erkko thought, as ridiculous as it was, that Stalin would make the initiative to continue negotiations. Erkko didn't seem to understand that national identities between the Finns and the Russians were different and that the Soviet Union was a superpower which didn't take her small neighbor's benefits into account.

Why did Erkko act so foolhardily? There was a possibility of war breaking out in which case Finland would have to fight against the Soviet Union, the population of which was 50 times as big as Finland's. There was no military or even economic assistance coming from abroad. Sweden's Prime Minister Albin Hansson had clearly pointed out that if the Soviet Union attacked Finland, there was nothing Sweden could do to help Finland.

Finnish historian Martti Turtola suspects that Erkko's stubborn behavior might be a result of an informal promise of assistance. Erkko and President Kyösti Kallio took part in a meeting which was held in Stockholm between 18 and 19 October 1939. The presidents and the foreign ministers from all Nordic

countries were also there. President Kallio returned to Finland after the two-day meeting while Erkko stayed in Stockholm for an extra day. On that particular day Erkko had a discussion with Rikard Sandler, Sweden's Foreign Secretary about Finland's uncomfortable situation. On the next day Erkko flew back to Finland acting "very strangely and smiling", as Turtola puts it. He has suggested that perhaps Sandler promised Erkko Sweden's assistance in case of the Soviet Union's attack. Turtola has no evidence to confirm his doubts because Erkko's son, the minister and media mogul Aatos Erkko has denied him an access to his father's archives (Turtola 1997). If Erkko really got an informal promise of assistance from Sandler, was he really so stupid to lay the destiny of Finland on that tiny, worthless promise? He should have known that getting military assistance from Sweden depended on the Swedish parliament which was hardly willing to send troops to fight against the mighty Soviet Union.

5. CLOSING WORDS

Finland had, despite the optimism, prepared for rainy days: the army had been mobilized at the beginning of October and more troops had been transferred to the Karelian Isthmus. Suursaari had been evacuated on October 11, which turned out to be the right decision. Evacuation would have been impossible once a war had started. A small guard battalion was left on the island. The army headquarters knew that battalion was far too small to defend the island, but at that time the Finnish army simply didn't have enough men or equipment. When the war broke out on 30 November, the Red Army invaded Suursaari and conquered it without firing any weapons. Finnish troops had by then fled from the island.

As mentioned before, the question of the outer islands should not, however, be underestimated. Stalin started pressing Finland by demanding the islands. Only later did he begin to long for the Karelian Isthmus and the Hanko Peninsula. One other thing should also be notified: the outer islands were the only question, on which a mutual understanding could have been reached.

At the end of November optimistic atmosphere existed in Finland. People didn't believe in the possibility of the Soviet Union's attack. After all, winter was already coming and people thought that the Red Army could not successfully survive Finland's climate. Erkko was the one who least expected hostilities of the Soviet Union. War Secretary Niukkanen even suggested that the army should be demobilized. Optimistic atmosphere was soon gone and what a rude awakening it was! Even Erkko woke up from his day dreams when the Red Army's bombers appeared over Helsinki and started bombing the city. As it turned out, Stalin had not been bluffing.

SOURCES:

Oral sources:

Turtola, Martti: *"Finnish Foreign Policy 1917-1939"*. A lecture at University of Helsinki. 17.03.1997.

Literature:

Anttila, Risto: *Suursaari, Suomenlahden helmi*. Kokemäki 1996

Kallenautio, Jorma: *Suomi katsoi eteensä. Itsenäisen Suomen ulkopoliittikka 1917-1955*. Helsinki 1985

Lappalainen, Niilo: *Suursaari toisessa maailmansodassa*. Juva 1987

Meri, Veijo: *Suurta olla pieni kansa*. Keuruu 1996

Myllyniemi, Seppo: *Suomi Sodassa 1939-1945*. Keuruu 1982

Paasikivi, J. K.: *Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939-1941*. Juva 1979

Suomi, Juhani: *Talvisodan tausta. Neuvostoliitto Suomen ulkopoliittikassa 1937-1939*. Keuruu 1989

Levente Benkő, *ISHA Budapest*

THE DUEL OF THE HOOD AND THE BISMARCK (MAY 24 – 27, 1941)

Although a great deal has been written in Great Britain and in Germany about one of the strangest duels of the naval history of World War II, the four days in May 1941 that sealed the fates of two giant warships the *Hood* and the *Bismarck*, the full circumstances of this tragic episode are still not clear. More than a quarter of a century later, the reasons for certain decisions remain wrapped in mystery; Admirals Holland and Lütjens have taken their secrets with them to the grave, and the survivors of the two ships (three from the *Hood* and 115 from the *Bismarck*) included only four junior officers (1 British and 3 German), who could not give the reasons for their superior' decisions.

What we do know is that the objective and execution of the *Bismarck's* first and last mission, Operation "Rheinübung" were first described in a directive from Grand-Admiral Reader on April 2, 1941. According to this document, the *Bismarck's* squadron would be allowed to attack escorted convoys on the Atlantic, and could take on an opponent of equal strength only to allow other members of the squadron to get the merchantmen.

The *Bismarck* possessed a powerful offensive armament and superb defensive strength. The battleship's main armament consisted of eight 15-inch guns in four two-gun turrets and, beside the superb optical ranging equipment possessed by German warships, *Bismarck* was fitted with a "radioelementer", a 90-cm wavelength type of radar, for range calculating. Defensively, she had a 12.6 inch belt of armour on the hull, turrets armoured to 14-inches thickness and decks 8 inches thick. Her great beam (188 feet) and large number of watertight compartments gave her a great degree of underwater protection, and her engines, developing 138,000 hp, enabled her to reach 30 knots.

She had been commissioned on August 24, 1940, and as she made ready for her first and last sortie, had nine months of intensive training behind her. On the evening of May 20, 1941, the *Bismarck* and the *Prinz Eugen*, another brand new ship, after passing through the Kattegat, emerged into the North Sea. As early as the following morning, news that the two German warships had left the Baltic reach London. The Admiralty immediately alerted Admiral Sir John Tovey, C.-in-C. Home Fleet, and also informed him that the aircraft-carrier *Victorious* and battle-cruiser *Repulse* had been put at his disposal. Tovey was quite sure that the *Bismarck's* aim was a naval sortie in the Atlantic; consequently, he strengthened the patrols along the Orkneys-Shetlands-Faeroes-Iceland-Greenland line, and on the evening of May 21, ordered Vice-Admiral L.E. Holland's battle Cruiser Squadron (the battle-cruiser *Hood*, the battle ship *Prince of Wales*, and six destroyers) to sail from Scapa Flow to Hvalfjord. Tovey would thus be assured of a considerable superiority in firepower over his adversary: eight 15-inch and ten 14-inch against 15-inch guns.

It is true, however, that the *Hood* was beginning to show her age. Commissioned in 1920, she reflected World War I ideas for naval warfare. In particular her defences against plunging fire left a great deal to be desired. *The Prince of Wales* was fitted with a main armament new to the Royal Navy, and had

not yet proved herself.

On May 22 another reconnaissance of Korsfjord made in bad weather showed that the two German ships left, so late in the evening the main British fleet sailed from Scapa Flow under Admiral Tovey. Beside the *King George V* (a sister ship of the *Prince of Wales*), Tovey also had the aircraft-carrier *Victorious*, 4 cruisers and 7 destroyers. The battle-cruiser *Repulse* joined him later.

With operation "Rheinübung" under way, Admiral Lütjens had two options for breaking out to the Atlantic: passing through the Denmark Straits between Greenland and Iceland (which had been reduced to a width of 60 miles by minefields and pack ice), or the 300-mile gap between Iceland and the Faeroes. His staff advised him to choose the latter, but he rather opted for the former. Some military historians consider this choice to have been mistaken, pointing out that had they taken the route south of Iceland, the German ships could have slipped through the area between the Battle Cruiser Squadron and the Home Fleet (the British had only three cruisers on patrol in the area). Perhaps the German admiral intended to pass through under the disguise of fog and rain.

However, on the evening of May 23, the cruiser *Suffolk* spotted the *Bismarck*, and reported their position on the Battle Cruiser Squadron approaching from the south-east (from the direction of the Faeroe-islands). At 05:35 next morning, the Squadron made visual contact with the two German battleships of the starboard bow, in an excellent position for all the turrets to open fire. Yet a few minutes later Vice-Admiral Holland altered course, with the result that the rear turrets of his ships could no longer be used: British superiority in firepower which originally was 18 to 8, had thus been reduced to 10 to 8, an - after the first salvo - 9 to 8, because on of the *Prince of Wales's* 14-inch guns could not be reloaded. Holland's manoeuvre has given rise to a great deal of controversy, and many critics attacked him seriously for going to battle with, in fact, one hand tied behind his back. Nevertheless, ballistic considerations may have dictated the change of course: beyond the range of about 12,000 yards, the German shells, plugging down at a steep angle, would have torn straight through the *Hood's* inadequately armoured deck. By turning directly towards the enemy, Holland could get his ship inside the dangerous plunging trajectory of the *Bismarck's* shells to a position where any hits would be on the 12-inch belt rather than the 3.75-inch deck.

At 05:52, Admiral Holland gave orders to open fire on the *Bismarck*. However, the two German battleships swapped places during the night, and the *Hood's* fire was now directed against the *Prinz Eugen*. It was the *Prince of Wales* which chortle identified the German flagship, and opened fire. On the other hand, it meant that the anticipated superiority of 18 to 8 in guns had in fact turned into 5 to 8 inferiority.

At exactly 06:00, the ensuing battle took a sudden and unexpected turn: just as the British squadron began to turn to port (in order to be able to use their rare turrets), a whole salvo of 15-inch shells from the *Bismarck* landed on the *Hood*, scoring a series of direct hits, and seeming to crush everything under it with irresistible force. An incredible explosion followed, between the second funnel and the mainmast, and huge holes opened up throughout the hull. In the midst of this inferno, the forward turrets of the British battle cruiser fired one last salvo, but there was no doubt in the mind of anyone who saw the incident that the *Hood* was about to go down instantly. In these terrible circumstances, it is not surprising

that out of the total crew 1,419 only 3 survived.

Having disposed of the *Hood*, the *Bismarck* and the *Prince Eugen* turned their attention to the *Prince of Wales*, which had as yet not been fired on. In a period of only a few minutes, however, the German ships landed four 15-inch and three 8-inch shells on the British battleship. One of them hit the compass platform, killing or wounding everyone except for the ships' captain. Moreover, the *Prince of Wales* was suffering from serious breakdowns in the turrets. After a less than 15-minute engagement, the British ship retired under smoke screen.

Having fired only 93 shells (less than 10% of her stock of main calibre shells), the *Bismarck* achieved brilliant results. But she had also been hit by two of the *Prince of Wales's* 14-inch shells. One of them hit a fuel tank, causing it to leak. This contaminated the fuel with sea water, which seriously affected the *Bismarck's* performance. Therefore, at 08:00 Admiral Lütjens informed his superiors that he was heading for repairs at Saint Nazaire, on German-occupied France's Atlantic coast.

In the light of the *Bismarck's* unfortunate encounter with the British Fleet a few days later, one might ask the question why Lütjens did not turn back to the north, heading for a German port. If the *Bismarck* had tried to return via the Denmark Strait (as her captain, by the way, vainly suggested to Lütjens), probably nothing would have prevented her safe return to Korsfjord. However, this would have certainly prevented her from continuing the mission of attacking merchant shipping.

The news that the *Hood* had blown up struck the Admiralty as a lighting. Nevertheless, quick measures were taken to remedy the situation and restore the reputation of the Royal Navy: they had set on the *Bismarck's* tail, cruisers, and destroyers, not hesitating to rob the Atlantic convoys of their escorts in the process. The chasers approached the *Bismarck* in two groups: one from the east (the battle-cruisers *King George V*, and *Repulse*, the aircraft-carrier *Victorious*, plus four cruisers and seven destroyers), and one from the south (Force H.), with the aircraft-carrier *Ark Royal* in the lead.

Since the destroyers from the Battle-Cruiser Squadron were shadowing the *Bismarck* with their radars from the rear, the Admiralty knew about the exact location of the German ship. Admiral Tovey set the Home Fleet on an interception course that would allow it to engage the two German ships at some time the following morning, even if they tried to return to the North Sea by passing south of Iceland. To slow down the *Bismarck*, Tovey decided to send in his *Swordfish* torpedo-bombers from the *Victorious*.

But both the *Victorious* and her aircrew were untrained, and more important, the weather had turned awful. Despite the weather, the *Swordfish* carried out an attack against the *Bismarck*, with no apparent result: their torpedoes did little but damage her paintwork. In the depth of the night all the aircraft managed to relocate the *Victorious* and land safely.

Meanwhile, events had been moving swiftly. First of all, Lütjens ordered the *Prinz Eugen* to leave the flagship and operate independently, and then, much to Tovey's anger, the destroyer *Suffolk* lost contact with the *Bismarck*. Matters were not improved by the fact that the long radio message sent by Lütjens in the early morning hours of May 25 was intercepted by the British: its bearing was incorrectly plotted and led Tovey to the conclusion that the Germans were moving one of the Royal Navy's vessels having to withdraw to Newfoundland, Iceland or even to Gibraltar. In fact, of the 15 units which had sailed

on May 22, *King George V* was the only one left in the Central Atlantic.

The turning point came on May 26: a patrolling British reconnaissance airplane spotted the *Bismarck* about 1100 kilometres off Brest. It happened at 10:30, and although Admiral Tovey was not in a position to intercept, Sir John Soreville, commander of a force H, was able to send in a strike of the *Swordfish* from the *Ark Royal*. If they could succeed in only slowing down the *Bismarck* before midnight, the battle would be won: it would enable British ships to intercept her. Otherwise, the *King George V* and the *Rodney* would be forced to withdraw for refuelling.

The first strike was launched at 14:50, but it was a total failure: the pilots mistakenly attacked the destroyer *Sheffield* that Somerville sent ahead for keeping a "radar-eye" on *Bismarck*. Fortunately for *Sheffield*, the British torpedoes exploded the moment they touched the water - demonstrating their inefficiency. The second strike flew off at 19:10, and reached its target some 90 minutes later. Despite the hail of fire from all of the *Bismarck's* guns, the attack went on successfully between 20:45 and 21:25, and scored two hits. The first struck the armour belt and caused no damage, but the second damaged her propellers, wrecked the steering gear and jammed the rudders. After desperate but unsuccessful efforts to free them, Lütjens sent the following message: "No longer able to steer the ship. We will fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer".

After describing two complete circles, the luckless *Bismarck* headed slowly north-northwest, straight towards the *King George V* and the *Rodney*. On the morning of May 27, two British battleships arrived at the scene, and opened fire at the *Bismarck* - now moving at a speed of only 7 knots - at 08:47. The *King George V* and the *Rodney* blasted the German ship with their ten 14-inch and nine 16-inch guns until 10:15, when Tovey ceased fire and withdrew to refuel. By this time the *Bismarck* was a battered wreck, ablaze from stem to stern, with all her guns silenced, but her flag still flying proudly.

It should be pointed out here that there is a difference of opinion between the British and German historians about the last few minutes of the *Bismarck's* life. The British claim that the German battleship was finally sunk by two torpedoes from the destroyer *Dorsetshire* at 10:36. German historians do not dispute the time, but claim that she was scuttled by the crew, after all her armament had been knocked out, to prevent her falling into the hands of the British. What does seem clear, however, is that none of the British shells succeeded in penetrating the *Bismarck's* belt or deck armour.

In any case, the conclusion of Sir John Tovey's report stated: "The *Bismarck* fought an extremely courageous battle against greatly superior forces; in the best tradition of the old German Imperial Navy, she went down with her colors flying."

Giulio Bobbo, University of Venice

The LOST ENTERPRISE

THE ITALIAN NAVY DURIGN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

10 June 1940; Italy declared war against England and France. Mussolini in his speech promised: Win! and we are going to win! All the armed forces were mobilized for a war that everyone thought would be short and easy. But the truth was very different; France was lost, but England resisted and her navy, the mythical Royal Navy was very strong, in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean.

Regia Marina (Italian navy) at that moment was the most modern and motivated force of the Italian armed forces. With six battleships, twenty-two cruisers, sixty destroyers and more than one hundred and twenty submarines, it was the fourth navy in the world, the most important in the Mediterranean.

This fleet was well distributed in more than ten naval stations in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Libya and the Greek Islands; the most important was La Spezia for the Western Mediterranean and Taranto for the Eastern Mediterranean. But this huge giant had clay feet. The problems that heartened his operational capabilities was common to the army and the air force: shortage of fuel and ammunition; rivalry and lack of cooperation between the navy and the air force in the sea operations. The war was declared with a wrong system of high-level command, the intelligence's and recognition's information lost in a long chain of bureaucratic orders.

The Royal Navy had two fleets in the Mediterranean: The "H" fleet at Gibraltar and the Mediterranean fleet at Alexandria. For the number of ships and location of their stations (Gibraltar, Alexandria and Malta) RN was more shattered and more vulnerable to air and sea attacks. However, the British navy had well trained crews, the control of the two "doors" of the Mediterranean sea, Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. A great number of battleships and carriers could have been run up when necessary.

For three years those two "armadas" fought in the hot waters of the Mediterranean. The final objective was the same, the control and escort of the convoys that carried man and weapons for operations in Northern Africa. All sea battles fought between 1940 and 1943 were led for the presence (true or wrong) of a merchant convoy to defend (or destroy).

The first important battle between the two fleets was fought in the middle of the Ionian sea, 9 July 1940 and was called the Battle of *Punta Stilo*. The Italian fleet, as ordered by Admiral Campioni, was returning to Taranto from a convoy escort mission. It was composed of two battleships, fourteen cruisers and sixteen destroyers. The British fleet was sailing to Malta for an escort mission, was commanded by Vice Admiral Andrew Cunningham and was composed of one carrier, three battleships, five cruisers and fourteen destroyers.

The contact between the two fleets was short and happened when the *Giulio Cesare* (Italian flagship) was hit by an 18 inch projectile. The battleship slowed down and Campioni decided to retreat with all the naval squad. The cruiser *Bolzano* too was slightly hit, while in the British squad one aerial bomb hit the cruiser *Gloucester*, killing the commander and nineteen men.

The battle ended without winner, but was very useful for both the Italians and the British. The Italians had discovered that the cooperation between the navy and the air force simply did not exist. The Italian bombers reached the battlefield too late and then bombed... the friendly fleet!, but fortunately without any consequences. The high-level naval bombing was inaccurate and dangerous, and after the battle the Italian ships painted red and with stripes on the upper deck. The navy knew that its artillery fire was imprecise since only one projectile hit the cruiser *Neptune*, without any consequences.

The British had discovered that the training of the torpedo-bombers' crews was inadequate, but they knew that the Italian waters were safe. The Mediterranean fleet cruised many times to the Sicilian Canal without taking a risk.

During the months that followed this first contact, Supermarina didn't make any effort to minimize the fleet's defect. The escort missions continued and five destroyers and frigates were sunk by the Mediterranean fleet. The Royal Navy instead prepared and concretized one formidable action against the Italians, the Taranto's Night.

On 11 November 1940 two flights of bombers took off from the carrier *Illustrious*, that was sailing 170 miles off the Italian coast, and flew to Taranto naval base, where the Italian fleet, 6 battleships, nine cruisers and many destroyers were stationed. The bombing began with a complete surprise at 11 p.m. and finished at 12:30 p.m.

It was a disaster: four battleships were hit, three returned to service after few months, one (the *Cavour*) incapable of fighting against the enemy was abandoned at Trieste after the armistice and sunk by allied bombers during 1945.

The consequence of the Taranto's attack was that only two battleships were ready to fight in the winter 1940-41, the *Vittorio Veneto* and the *Giulio Cesare*.

Sixteen days after Taranto the two fleets ran across each other at Capo Teulada, but without important consequences.

None of the contenders risked a complete battle, the Italians with only two operational battleships and the British with a convoy to escort. The Italian air force was hiding.

During the war against the allied forces (1940-43), the Italian navy had a submarine base in the Atlantic, at Bordeaux. In three years of operations thirty-two submarines sunk more than a hundred merchant ships and made many voyages from Bordeaux to Japan, transporting precious equipment. It was a good page of naval history, but those submarines should perhaps have been more useful in the Mediterranean.

1941 was a very long year for the Italian navy bringing a series of victories and defeats for both enemies. The Royal Navy had begun an offensive strategy against the Italian fleet and territory. The British intelligence feared an Italian assault-landing in the Balearic Islands. The Axis diplomacy was working for Spain's declaration of war against the allied forces. It was a sign that the Mediterranean was a battle zone, and not *Mare Nostrum*, as Mussolini said.

This offensive was concretized in two attacks on the Italian soil. On 2 February the torpedo-bomber *Swordfish* deployed her weapons over the dam of Tirso, in Sardinia. Fortunately for the Italians,

the mission was a failure, but few days later the Royal Navy achieved another good action against an Italian naval base.

On 9 February the "H" force, with the *Malaya* battleship as a flagship opened artillery fire against the city of Genova. In a half-hour 1401 projectiles killed 144 people and hit various civil and military objects. The Italian fleet tried to hunt the enemy that was retrieving but, because of bad aerial recognition and wrong naval maneuvers (and the historical slow flow of information from Supermarina), it couldn't get the contact.

In this period Regia Marina was trying to block the British convoys carrying ammunitions and troops for the Greek front. The ships departed from Egypt and Gibraltar and their destination was Pireo Harbor. In order to destroy this traffic a huge naval squad took the sea, the 27 March 1941, to make a sortie in the Aegean sea. Unfortunately its commandant, Admiral Jachino, didn't know that one recon airplane had spotted him. In a short time the enemy fleet was out to Alexandria to reach the Crete's coast.

Naturally, Jachino couldn't hope to get aerial support. Cunningham had in his squad the carrier *Formidable* with a good number of torpedo bombers.

In the morning of 28 began a chain of events that would end with the most terrible tragedy for the Italian navy, the Battle of Capo Matapan. The Italian fleet discovered the first group of British cruisers and opened fire without results. When the contact was broken, Jachino felt that the enemy's battleships and the carrier were near. Realizing that it was too dangerous to continue the contact without aerial support, he decided to retreat. He was right. The bombers from the *Formidable* attacked the squad many times. At 15:19 one torpedo hit the flagship *Vittorio Veneto*, without lethally damaging her. At 19:28 another torpedo hit the cruiser *Pola*, damaging her seriously. The engine stopped without electricity. Jachino knew what was to happen only one hour later and ordered that two cruisers, the *Zara* and the *Fiume*, should come back and rescue the immobilized ship. It was night, everybody thought that a battle was impossible, but the English fleet had pursued the formation and arrived at Pola. Two cruisers, with four destroyers arrived to rescue after few minutes. The British had sighted the objectives with the radar, a useful hardware that the Italians didn't have. At 22:38 the *Warspite*, the *Barham* and the *Valiant* opened fire against the Italian ships and slowed down ready for towing operation. It was a massacre. In three minutes three cruisers and destroyers were sunk. The British ships rescued 1162 sailors, but other 2331 were killed now or after spending many days in the sea. The tragedy was caused because of more than one reason, but the lack of night practice and radar were the real causes.

After the Battle of Matapan, Supermarina finally decided to order two carriers modified by two passenger ships and the radar (German). In the middle of 1941 the situation was very bad. The navy and the air force that were fighting on the sea needed help: this help was the Luftwaffe. The German air force began to hit the military and merchant convoys, and in few months the situation was upset. Crete was invaded by German paratroops and the Mediterranean fleet had only one battleship alive.

However, the British hunt of the axis convoys in the Sicily Canal was terrible. Many civilian ships were sunk during all summer of 1941. British submarines and cruisers seemed to be everywhere. The

Italians didn't know that the English intelligence had found the code to the high-command's secret messages (the famous Enigma), and knew when a ship started from Italy to the African coast. The allied convoys with reinforcements for the troops in Africa didn't have to cross the dangerous waters of the Mediterranean. They could make the periplus of the African Continent without any risk. Furthermore when the United States declared war, the number of ships and material was much greater.

For reinforcement of Malta with man, aircraft... and food the Royal Navy prepared a lot of huge convoys, but the Italians too had a secret card to play: near, very near to Gibraltar there was one secret service's base, that could view all that happened in Gibraltar. Very few people knew that after the declaration of war against Algeria (one Spanish city two miles from Gibraltar) one old Italian ship, the *Olterra*, had a group of navy intruders on board. The English intelligence had never found out where was the enemy base was.

The last contact between the two fleets (both of them escorting merchant convoys) during the 1941 was the first Battle of Sirte, but no major results were achieved.

Few days after the Regia Marina achieved a good shot against the RN. Six men drove their special weapons (called *maiali*, pigs) to the Alexandria harbor, and sunk two enemy battleships (the *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Valiant*). The Mediterranean fleet became very vulnerable after that.

1942 began with many hopes for the axis forces. Malta was isolated, and Rommel was beating the Commonwealth forces on the African soil. The imperative was to refurbish the lone island. In January five ships reached Malta. Two months later other four ships brought reinforcement and hope to the besieged defenders. One naval squad of Regia Marina tried to intercept them, but the units of the British escort engaged the Italians in the second Battle of Sirte, and the night made them loose the contact.

At 11 June two convoys sailed from Gibraltar (the *Harpoon*) and Alexandria (the *Victorious*), hoping that at least one would reach Malta. The *Victorious* was attacked by German and Italian bombers, submarines and MAS. After the loss of 4 merchant ships and four warships, the convoy's commander Admiral Harwood decided to retrieve with all the ships still available. The *Harpoon* was composed of six merchant ships escorted by more than twenty ships, with two carriers, one battleship, two cruisers and seven destroyers. Supermarina found the objective at 15 and decided to attack. The Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica began at once to beat the convoy the 14, sinking one civilian ship and damaging one cruiser. The same day the British battleship and carrier retrieved for Gibraltar.

The next day, early in the morning, the Battle of Pantelleria began: the enemy convoy was attacked by the Italian surface fleet.

The convoy reached Malta with only two merchantmen and all the warships damaged. It was a very fine success for the axis forces.

Another convoy departed from Gibraltar exactly one month later. This time there were 14 merchant ships escorted by the entire Home fleet: two battleships, four carriers, seven cruisers, more than twenty destroyers.

Supermarina decided to deploy eleven submarines near the Balearian Islands and near Capo Bon, but couldn't utilize its battleships, The lack of fuel was a big problem for the Italian fleet in the late 1942.

However, a great attack on the convoy was prepared.

It was a superb battleplan. The results arrived very early: on June 11 an Italian submarine damaged the carrier *Furious*. Nine hours later one U-boat sunk the carrier *Eagle*. More than one-hundred Italian and German bombers attacked the convoy the day after. So far the merchant ships, the very objective of the axis forces were still undamaged but at the evening of this terrible day the second group of submarines begun the action, followed during the night by the torpedo boats. Nine out of fourteen ships which formed the convoy were sunk. In the morning of 13 the situation of the convoy was desperate. Now was the moment for the Italian fleet to encounter five destroyers and one little cruiser. But Supermarina decided not to attack the convoy without the arcola support, that Kesserling denied the Italians. The Italian fleet, alone in the sea had two cruisers damaged by one British submarine, the *Unbroken*.

Five merchant ships can now unload 30 000 tons of reinforcement at Malta, that recuperate all his dangerous force.

For the Italian navy, the troops on Africa, for Italy it's the end. The Italian ships without fuel can't exit to his harbor, the royal navy instead can bring many big convoys on Malta and on Africa. At October the eight army crashes the axis front at El-Alamein, two weeks later the allied fleet begin the operation torch, the assault landing and the invasion of Marocco and Algeria.

The events speed up: at many ends the last resistance on Africa. At June the Italian soil begun to be occupied by allied forces.

For the navy take the sea was impossible, for the lack of fuel and ammunitions. However the admiral Bergamini prepares the last sortie, all the Italian ships still on water depart from the base of La Spezia for a suicide mission against the allied fleet (there are the Americans too, now).

But the armistice is faster than this project; the eight September Bergamini receive the order to get out of La Spezia with all the ships available and sail to Bona, in Algeria. The last destination is Malta, where the fleet has to consign herself at the Mediterranean fleet that is waiting near the coasts of Sicily.

One of the armistice conditions was in fact that the Regia Marina becomes an hostage of the allied forces, didn't have much confidence in the Italian government.

The date of 9 September 1943 signed the last tragedy for the Italian navy: the battleship *Roma*, the newest of the fleet, was attacked and sunk by German airplanes with guided bombs, over 1300 sailors died in this last, useless massacre. The last sailing for Malta, that many people considered to be shameful and craven, was the greatest service that the navy offered to Italy and to the Italians in the Second World War. The allied forces, like Churchill said, understood after this event that Italy really wanted the peace and the alliance with the free world.

Many mistakes were made by the navy during the war, but the bravery and determination of the men that sailed for three years in the Mediterranean against the most powerful navy in the world are out of discussion for admission of Cunningham and all the men of the royal navy. In the late 1943 an enterprise to defeat the British navy in the Mediterranean failed. The navy started another war that brought liberation to the Italians after another two terrible years of civil war against the fascist and nazi forces.

THE SWISS TRADE FLEET IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In 1941 the Swiss Government decided to build up a trade fleet. What were the economical and political reasons for that? After the War, the whole project was considered as a success by the Government. Even today Switzerland supports its fleet. The present discussion about the role of Switzerland in World War II stresses the actuality of the topic.

The Economic Situation at the Beginning of the Second World War

In 1939, before the outbreak of the Second World War, the director of the *Federal War-Industry and Transportation Authority* Mr. Renggli gave a speech on the following topic: "Duties and Organisation of the Swiss War-Economy".¹

He stressed the huge damage that the war nowadays could cause to the economy of the involved nations. The strong influence of the war was, as Renggli said, firstly because of the big international economic interweaving and dependencies, and secondly because the war today is waged on all levels, including an economical one.²

Switzerland, in the director's opinion, which he shared with most of the people at that time, was in a worse position than other countries. It is a landlocked country, which means it has no access to the sea, it has almost no natural resources and it is strongly internationally interwoven.

For our topic, the most important of the points above is, that Switzerland has no access to the sea. The director of the War-Industry and Transportation Authority was also very concerned with that fact. He feared that during a war his country would no longer have access to the river Rhine and the harbours on the Mediterranean Sea. His first conclusion out of the economic situation of Switzerland was that the country should keep its neutrality. Total economical autarchy, as another solution of the problem, could in his opinion never be reached. Switzerland needed to import cheaper products from the world market. Agricultural self-sufficiency for example would make living-costs extremely higher. Primary tasks for Switzerland to prepare for a war, were in Renggli's opinion to lay in the stock, specially food, making some basic industries internationally independent, organising the labour-force and keeping the supply from outside as upright as possible.

¹ P. Renggli, Aufgaben und Organisation der schweizerischen Kriegswirtschaft. In: Aufgaben und Organisation der schweizerischen Kriegswirtschaft. Schriften des Zentralverbandes schweizerischer Arbeitgeberorganisationen, No. 34, Zürich 1939, p. 5-16.

² This is the origin of the expressions "total war" and "war industry".

We are mostly interested in the last point. On 1 April 1938 the Swiss government had released a law for the "guarantying of the country's supply with vital goods."³ Paragraph six says: "The Federal Council makes preparations for guarantying of transportation in case of economical isolation or war."

The Federal War-Industry and Transportation Authority was founded to care about that task. Before the outbreak of the war it was occupied with negotiations with other countries to secure the Swiss access to seaports. The *War Transport Authority* (Sektion für Seetransporte) had to coordinate the Swiss Trade-Fleet.⁴

The Foundation of the Swiss Trade Fleet

In 1941 the Swiss Government decided to build up the Swiss fleet under the Swiss banner. There were several reasons for making such a decision.

First: During the war it was very difficult to borrow ships.

Second: The neutral Swiss goods travelled under foreign banners. These foreign banners were not a protection for the Swiss goods. The Government tried to solve the problem by borrowing ships from other neutral countries. For example, they borrowed fifteen Greek ships, but when Greece entered the Second World War, Switzerland was again without neutral ships. Italy did not allow Greek ships with Swiss goods to pass the Mediterranean Sea.

So, Switzerland was suddenly without access to the important Italian ports. Under these circumstances the Government decided immediately to found the Swiss fleet. In only thirty days the Swiss maritime law was written and accepted by the Government. The same day the maritime law came into effect, two ships owned by the Swiss shipping company had received the right to sail under the Swiss banner. At the end of 1941 there were already eight ships under the Swiss banner. The climax was in 1944 with twelve ships.

An Example: the M/S Sântis

In the following there is a concrete example of a Swiss ship. It is the motorship Sântis. The biography of the ship is typical for most of the Swiss ships.

1. The ship was already very old (26 years) when it was bought by the Swiss War Transport Authority. So, they had even to be happy to find an old ship.
2. Most of the ships were in bad condition, so that some maintenance was necessary.

³ Bundesgesetz über die Sicherstellung der Landesversorgung mit lebenswichtigen Gütern (1. April 1938). In: ibidem, p. 17-22.

⁴ Die Schweizerische Kriegswirtschaft 1939/1948. Bericht des eidgenössischen Volkswirtschafts-Departemenets. Hg. von der eidg. Zentralstelle für Kriegswirtschaft, Bern 1950. Eidgenössisches Kriegs-Transport-Amt, p. 109-147.

3. The ships were not resold immediately after the war. They were still necessary to keep up the supply.

The Swiss had not much experience with the sea. If we look at the crew list of the *Sântis*, we will see the solution of the problem. Most of the crew was from Portugal. This was typically for the Swiss ships in that time. Some other nations allowed only crew-members of neutral state on the Swiss ships. The Swiss worked in the professions in which they had experience: for example, with motors or in the kitchen. Other nationalities had to do the real navigation work.

The Importance of Swiss Ships

Were the Swiss ships important for the supply of Switzerland? On the first impression the supply by Swiss ships was really important. The improvement of the supply by the sea was very big. In 1944 the import was small because of the general situation in Europe. The question is: Was the imported stuff all food or something else? During the war in Italy, the port of Genoa was closed for Swiss ship traffic. Because of that the quantity of the import in the years 1943 and 1945 is smaller and in 1944 it is even zero. In this period the Swiss sea traffic used other ports. The ships did not only bring food – almost a half of the goods were non-food products. The export of goods, especially in the years 1940 and 1941, was also important.

In short, the ships did not only help supply the Swiss with food, but also keep the standard of living with non-food imports and the full employment by export.

Import and Export

On the list with examples of non-food goods transported by the *M/S Sântis* from South America to Genoa there are more or less necessary products such as toothbrushes or chalk for schools. Nevertheless, there are also very luxurious goods as motion pictures. The biggest part (3500 tons) is the supply of electronic components for the Swiss industry. The list gives the following impression: the *M/S Sântis* went to South America and took 3500 tons of insulators; the rest of the ship space was filled up with different stuff they could get – only because of that the small amounts are explicable, such as 100 kilograms of print colours.

Before the war, in 1938 Switzerland exported 125000 tons by sea and 488000 tons by land. Transport by sea was about a quarter of transport by land which was more important. Nearly half of the export by land was for Germany. In 1942 transport by sea was only 5 % of the transport by land which was not very reduced if we compare it with 1938. In 1942 Switzerland exported more than three quarter of the export by land to Germany.

It is also interesting to see the shifting between 1938 and 1942 on export by sea. Before the war,

Switzerland exported most to Great Britain. During the war Spain suddenly became very important. Nearly half of export by sea was now for Spain. Argentina and the USA had about the same part as in 1938.

Discussion on the Continuation of the Swiss Trade Fleet After the War

In May 1942 the Federal Commission for Transportation decided that Switzerland should give up its Trade Fleet by the end of the war. The whole project, in their opinion, had been a success and the organisation of the Federal War-Industry and Transportation Authority worked, according to the circumstances, very well. However, in the peacetime the Swiss fleet would be too expensive for the country and not competitive to the world market.⁵

In the following, a big discussion on the need of Switzerland to have ships started between the authorities, private and political organisations. It is very interesting to hear different arguments, because the discussion on the Trade Fleet is, as we shall see, very similar to the general arguing on the role of Switzerland in the Second World War.⁶

The Swiss Transportation Organisation (Schweizerischer Spediteurverband), a merger of private truck transportation companies, demanded, providing the same arguments as the Federal Commission, the abolition of the fleet at the end of the war.⁷

The Association of Swiss Shipping Companies replied that a Swiss fleet after the war would not need support by the government. It would in contrary bring profit to the Swiss industry. It dealt with a common scenario of fear, when they said, Switzerland, without its own ships, would not be allowed to participate in the international trade-agreements anymore. Separated from the rest of the world the country would have to pay much more for sea-transportation. This fear of being isolated was widespread in Switzerland at that time. The following argument of the shipping companies, that Switzerland should be prepared for future wars and therefore have its own ships, was also very common.⁸

The last argument of the Transportation Organisation is quite important. It claimed that the Trade Fleet was not alone responsible for the supply of Switzerland. First of all, the country was depending on the goodwill of other countries. In its final report the Federal War-Industry and Transportation Authority also emphasised how important for the success of the country's supply the cooperation with foreign governments was.

In the recent discussion, it is more and more seen, how dependent on the outside Switzerland was.

⁵ Maybe the Commission was still under the impression of how easy Switzerland could rent foreign ships and negotiate with other countries in 1939. It is possible that they therefore saw no need to keep ships in the peacetime, when they could also be organised so easily shortly before the war.

⁶ Schweizerische Kriegswirtschaft, op. cit., p. 139-146.

⁷ They sure represented this position, too, because of their own economical interests in transportation. They feared the loss of good cooperation with foreign shipping companies.

⁸ The opinion of the opponents of a Swiss fleet, that there would be peace in a foreseeable time, in the view of the shipping association was stupid and short-sighted.

Some people in favour of the fleet argued that after the war no country was obliged to give Switzerland transportation-capacities on their ships. Therefore its own fleet should be kept and supported by the government, to reassure Switzerland's supply. The fear of standing apart from the world market, the secure feeling and the prestige of having a fleet were stronger than economical aspects. Before the end of the Second World War Switzerland decided to keep the Trade Fleet.

The Trade Fleet from the Second World War until Today⁹

After the war, the Federal Council decided to keep the Swiss Ocean-Going Trade Fleet justified by the experiences of the past and in awareness of possible future wars, as they said. In 1947 the Government sold the ships to private Swiss companies, keeping them under Swiss flag with strong restrictions to the new owners. In the same time they supported the private shipping companies with loans and guaranties for credits.

In the federal law of 1953 the enlargement of the fleet was decided to satisfy the requirements on the supply of the country in wartime. After that, there were 36 ships of 18 companies sailing under Swiss flag. Three years before, in 1950, there were only 17 quite old ships with an average age of 17 years.

Until today several hundred million Swiss francs (or German marks) of credit guaranties were spoken by the Government to enlarge the fleet and renew old ships. The last federal resolution for the securing of the Swiss Trade Fleet was in 1981. In the official publication the credit guaranty of 300 million francs was justified by the need of having a competitive fleet and of course being prepared for a war.

Today, there are around 30 to 35 ships under Swiss flag, which put the country on about the 70th rank on the scale of ship-keeping nations. About the same rank are Colombia and Honduras, both of them are having access to the sea, Switzerland is not.

Bibliography (selection)

1. P. Renggli, *Aufgaben und Organisation der schweizerischen Kriegswirtschaft*. In: Aufgaben und Organisation der schweizerischen Kriegswirtschaft. Schriften des Zentralverbandes schweizerischer Arbeitgeberorganisationen, 34, Zürich 1939, p. 5-16.
2. *Die Scwiezerische Kriegswirtschaft 1939/1948*. Bericht des eidgenössischen Volkswirtschafts-Departemenets. Hg. von der eidg. Zentralstelle für Kriegswirtschaft, Bern 1950.
3. Walter Zürcher, *Die Schweizer Handelsschiffe 1939-1945*. Herford 1992.

⁹ Walter Zürcher, *Schweizer Flagge zur See*. Zürich 1986. Passim.

WHERE ARE WE GOING, WHERE HAVE WE BEEN? (FEW WORDS ABOUT ISHA'S HISTORY AND FUTURE)

The main goal of this article is not to give a full history of the International Students of History Association (ISHA). That would be, after all, impossible without complete and detail access to the ISHA archive (or that which should represent one and maybe is going to become a real archive one day).¹ However, bearing in mind the knowledge of ISHA from "inside" (in 1996/97 I was a member of the International Secretariat) and the way of how many of our member-sections work, as well having personal experience of frustration to be left without any information from very many sections for months etc., I seriously wonder whether anybody will ever be able to write an accurate history of our Association. Maybe history of ISHA will one day become another theme for some "Mystery in History" seminar that some future generation of history students from Leuven is going to organise one day?² However, during my year in Belgium I did make a few photocopies of some documents I had regarded as important. Precious information that are hidden there may reveal that (young) historians are often not learning from history and are repeating old mistakes.

The other goal I am not going to achieve with this article, but the one I will definitely try to broach i.e. suggest, are proposals for ISHA's future. During our VIIIth conference in Wroclaw, Poland, as the Academic co-ordinator I had presented a rather bleak letter³ about ISHA's conditions. The response was, more or less, enthusiastic. Like so many times in ISHA's history, during our seminars and conferences, people from all over Europe were eager to do something, help, write articles for ISHANews⁴, improve everything... And again not too many things had occurred afterwards. Seminars and conferences seem to have some kind of magical effect. But post-seminar depression is very strong. It usually lasts for weeks and months, and stops only a few days before another seminar or conference starts. Not enough for serious organisation.

Enthusiasm is essential for ISHA as well as for any other students' association. I am not worried about the fact that some sections are almost dying out, although they were very strong in the recent past. Take Utrecht, Mainz or the British sections as the most illustrative examples. Today we can hardly find any ISHA-contact person in the United Kingdom. When the Association was founded, Tim Levell was the

¹ Around 20 folders with printed information about everything ISHA was doing can be found in our office in Leuven. For some academic years, like 1994/95, it is going to be very easy to reconstruct what ISHA and the IS were doing. Wolfgang Wagner and Cyriel Kluiters did their job very well. The same cannot be said for some other years.

² ISHA Leuven had organised an international seminar entitled "Mystery in History" in Brussels at the very end of 1996 and during first two days of 1997. ISHA Leuven also organised two other international seminars: *Colonisation through History* in 1995/96 and *Studying History in Europe* in 1997/98.

³ During the conference I paraphrased a famous sentence of one American president: "I tremble for my Association when I know that God is just."

⁴ ISHANews is the official newsletter of ISHA. It is published and edited by the membris of the IS, who are, although it is not required, usually writing the majority of articles. Although this is a very good opportunity for everybody to have something published in English, or to exchange ideas with students of history in Togo, Iceland, Finland etc.. ISHA members were not very enthusiastic and eager to communicate in this way.

Public Relations Manager. A year later Colin Melvin from Scotland was ISHA's President. Universities of Nottingham, York, Durham, Leeds, Edinburgh and Warwick were our members or at least we had contacts there. The first official trip made by the newly elected International Secretariat for the year 1990/91 was to the United Kingdom.⁵

Utrecht had organised a brilliant Conference in 1994. In a very short time they had managed to publish ISHAJournal with all the papers presented there. One year later, Mainz did the same. As soon as the most demanding part of ISHA job was over, those sections died out. Not instantly, but slowly. Only old, old members were coming to conferences, and, eventually, even they had stopped to do so.⁶

There are different examples. ISHA Venice is one of the oldest and omnipresent. For many years Alex Lo Manto, since 1996 member and founder of ISHA Princeton, was more than an icon of our only Italian section.⁷ Today, after the "Mystery in History" 1996/97 ISHA Leuven seminar in Brussels, VIIIth annual "Religion through History" conference in Wroclaw and ISHA Zagreb "Man and Sea" seminar in Pula, which were characterised by noted presence of the Italian members, seems that everything is booming there. Vera Costantini was elected ISHA president for 1997/98.

ISHA Zagreb had similar development. Founded in 1994, it was growing and getting stronger all the time. We had managed to animate Zadar to join the Association. Still, only after the return of the huge group of young historians from Wroclaw who showed willing to organise a seminar in Pula, ISHA Zagreb has effloresced.

Constant growth is one thing that can save ISHA. "An ISHA Section a Month", like it was written in one of old ISHANews.⁸

Ups and downs, as long as they are not too numerous and drastic, are not going to endanger the future of ISHA. Something else can. Inactivity. Using ISHA only for travelling. Writing papers only in order to get money from sponsors. Not participating and exchanging ideas...

Should the members of the IS be unpaid volunteers? Should academic projects come from the IS or member sections? Is ISHA too academic or not academic enough? So many old-new problems and

questions. Some I had quoted from the ISHANews published in March of 1991.⁹ History seems to repeat itself. We are still fighting with the same problems and we still seem unable to find satisfactory answers.

In 1992 the third ISHA conference ("Gender and History") was organised in Helsinki, Finland. The Legislative Assembly (LA), the highest body of the organisation, made an important decision there. The number of the International Secretariat "functionaries" was reduced to three (President, Academic co-ordinator and Financial Manager). The seat of ISHA was moved from Budapest to Leuven, Belgium.¹⁰ The membership fee was considerably reduced. The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven offered many courses in English, giving the possibility to the IS members to study at the same time while working for the Organisation. Leuven is also close to the important European institutions. Finally, so many students' associations, like AIESEC (students of economy), ELSA (European lawyers), IAAS (future engineers of agriculture) have their headquarters in Brussels or Leuven.¹¹

The only problem connected with being in Leuven and which we had experienced several times, (which had culminated in 1997/98), was the impossibility of many students from transition countries to find enough money to come to Leuven. ISHA as a whole does not have enough money and it doesn't seem that we will be able to find any generous sponsors in nearby future. More money would imply full-time jobs, and different way of organising work in the IS and within ISHA as a whole. That is another problem that remains to be solved.

ISHA is not an island. We should integrate ourselves as much as possible into the world. We should participate there where our presence can enrich us or the others. The United Nations, UNESCO, even students' umbrella associations like IMISO (the Intersectorial Meeting of the International Students' Organisations) can only help us to stretch our horizons. That cannot do any harm. It can only help us to understand world around us.

There are so many important projects we have started and so many people that ISHA brought

⁹ *Ishanews*, no. 4. p. 5. ISHA-IS Archive, Leuven.

¹⁰ The members of the International Secretariats from 1990 to 1998 were:

In 1990/91 Zoltan Zarandy, President, Gabor Czoch, Financial Manager, Krisztina Fenyo, Academic coordinator, all from Hungary. Marc van den Muyzenberg, Secretary General, the Netherlands, Tim Levell, Public Relations, England, Christophe Poupet, Human Resources, France.

Zoltan Zarandy might be considered as ISHA's father. His idea of bringing students of history from, prior to 1989, divided Europe was supported by many important international institutions and individuals, like the Council of Europe, the Open Society Foundation, the Bosch Foundation, Otto von Habsburg, Geza Jesenski etc.

In 1991/92 there were only four members in the IS. Colin Melvin, President, Scotland, Nils Erik Forsgard, Secretary General, Finland, Anneli Randla, Human Resources, Estonia, Monika Bakony, Financial manager, Hungary.

In 1992/93 Nathalie Hombel, President, Belgium, Jaakko Autio, Academic coordinator, Finland, Bettina Vogel, Financial manager, Germany.

In 1993/94 Jozsef Litkei, President, Hungary, Esko Varho, Academic coordinator, Finland, Jan Verbrugge, Financial manager, Belgium.

In 1994/95 Wolfgang Wagner, President, Austria, Cyriel Kluiters, Financial manager, the Netherlands, Cristina Ion from Romania, elected Academic coordinator, was not able to come to Belgium.

In 1995/96 Martin Iversen, President, Denmark, Yuri Pavlyk, Academic coordinator, Ukraina, Maarit Laitinen (Jesse), Financial manager, Finland.

In 1996/97 Christine Sommer, President, Austria, Tvrtko Jakovina, Academic coordinator, Croatia, Mike Savelkoul, Financial manager, Belgium.

In 1997/98 Vera Costantini, President, Italy, Tamara Tyrpakova, elected Financial manager from Slovakia and Laszlo Mathe-Shires, elected Academic coordinator from Hungary were not able to come to Leuven.

¹¹ The IAAS have its headquarters in Heverle, Leuven. AIESEC and ELSA are situated in Brussels. Members of these International Secretariats are real professionals.

⁵ *Ishanews*, no. 1. p. 5-6. ISHA-IS Archive, Leuven.

⁶ ISHA has organised the following conferences and seminars:

The European Paradigm, Budapest 1990, *People on the Move*, Pecs 1991, *Gender and History*, Helsinki 1992, *What does it mean to be European through History?*, Tours 1993, *History of Daily Life*, Utrecht 1994, *Propaganda through History*, Mainz 1995, *Man and Nature*, Vienna 1996, *Religion through History*, Wroclaw 1997 and *Revolution?!*, Helsinki 1998.

Some of ISHA seminars, besides those organised by ISHA Leuven (see footnote 3), were: the first student seminar organised in the former Soviet Union that took place in Moscow in December 1990 (*History of Russia and the Soviet Union as a part of European History*). Seminar entitled *Europe in Cartography through History* was held in Tours in 1993. ISHA Gdansk and Mainz were discussing the *European Stereotypes* in 1993. An international colloquium was organised in 1992 in Budapest on the coronation rituals. In 1997 ISHA Vilnius had organised an international seminar entitled *Paganism and Christianity*. Seminar organised by ISHA Banska Bystrica was dealing with different ethnic groups in towns. First ISHA Zagreb seminar took place in Pula (being our first seminar on the Mediterranean coast) dealing with *Man and Sea*.

⁷ Alex Lo Manto should be given credit for the foundation of the Academic Board (AB). The role of this body, which consists of representatives of every section and 5 individual members elected by the Legislative Assembly (LA), is to head the academic side of ISHA's work.

⁸ *Ishanews*, no. 4. p. 7. ISHA-IS Archive, Leuven.

together. How many different lives of our members were changed thanks to ISHA? How many of us got a chance to see so many different countries? There are some results, nobody can deny that.

I hope that this article will save some of our past and help new ISHA members to shape our future. Wake up! It is time to change that what is wrong and to move ahead. We do not have a mandate to cry over the destiny of ISHA. ISHA was founded after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. Today, almost 10 years later, there are no new walls in Europe to be destroyed. Big "historical" motive for the foundation of ISHA has already been "worn out". What we cannot do is achieve less than we have achieved in past.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

<i>ISHA Bremen (Germany)</i>	<i>ISHA Venice (Italy)</i>
Peter Hayessen	Giulio Bobbo
	Lorenzo Calvelli
	Antonio Conzato
<i>ISHA Budapest (Hungary)</i>	Vera Costantini
Levente Benkő	Francisco Panteghini
Attila Demkő	Ilaria Pistorello
<i>ISHA Corfu (Greece)</i>	<i>ISHA Vienna (Austria)</i>
Photis Baroutsos	Christine Sommer
<i>ISHA Heidelberg (Germany)</i>	<i>ISHA Zadar (Croatia)</i>
Melanie Kraatz	Krunoslava Škunca
Simone Janson	
<i>ISHA Helsinki (Finland)</i>	<i>ISHA Zurich (Switzerland)</i>
Rae Häikiö	Claudia Bertogg
Mikko Väyrynen	Dominik Schatzmann
	Christian Schmidpeter
<i>ISHA Leuven (Belgium)</i>	<i>ISHA Zagreb (Croatia)</i>
Iris Gysels	Vladimir Brnardić
Leen Ketelslegers	Igor Duda
Daniel Vandenberghe	Tvrtko Jakovina
Jan Verbrugghe	Kristina Jurić
Hilde Wouters	Siniša Krznar
	Marijan Lipovac
	Marina Mayer
<i>ISHA Ljubljana (Slovenia)</i>	Mario Novak
Matija Janežič	Andelko Šušnjar
	Sandra Veselinović

LIST OF SPONSORS

Filozofski fakultet u Zagrebu
Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb

Pedagoški fakultet u Puli
Faculty of Pedagogy, Pula

Ministarstvo znanosti i tehnologije Republike Hrvatske
Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of Croatia

Grad Pula
City of Pula

Istarska upanija
County of Istria

Badel 1862 d.d. Zagreb

Dukat d.d. Zagreb

Ledo d.d. Zagreb

Arheološki muzej Istre Pula
Archaeological Museum of Istria, Pula

Povijesni muzej Istre Pula
Historical Museum of Istria, Pula

Hrvatska turistička zajednica
Croatian National Tourist Board

Turistička zajednica Pule
Tourism Office Pula



1/94

SPECIAL EDITION:

What does it mean
to be *European*
through history?

Papers of the Annual Conference of ISHA
Tours, France 1993



No 3

Student Protest in
Contemporary Europe

Edited by B. Henkens, C. Kuiters and W. Wigner



2/94

History of Daily Life

Papers of the 5th Isha Conference
Utrecht, The Netherlands
April 4-8, 1993


Edited by Bodien Abelt and Carine van Rhijn

Other ISHA publications

For purchase or subscription, please
contact the ISHA International Secretariat,
Blijde Inkomststraat 21, B-3000 Leuven
Belgium

*CONTENTS: The 250 page handbook (size
15x22,5 cm) details 90 history
departments of European
universities from Portugal
to Russia and from Norway to
Malta.*

*All of the essential information
needed for an exchange student is
included: the address of the
university, the quantity of
accomodation in the university
town, the specialisations of the
respective history departments,
etc.*



Antonia Ellerton